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Abstract 
 
 
The presence of different prices in different databases for the same securities can impair 
the comparability of research efforts and seriously damage the management decisions 
based upon such research. In this study we compare the six major sources of corporate 
Credit Default Swap prices: GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan, 
using the most liquid single name 5-year CDS of the components of the leading market 
indexes, iTraxx (European firms) and CDX (US firms) for the period from 2004 to 
2010. We find systematic differences between the data sets implying that deviations 
from the common trend among prices in the different databases are not purely random 
but are explained by idiosyncratic factors as well as liquidity, global risk and other 
trading factors. The lower is the amount of transaction prices available the higher is the 
deviation among databases. Our results suggest that the CMA database quotes lead the 
price discovery process in comparison with the quotes provided by other databases. 
Several robustness tests confirm these results.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market has grown rapidly.2 Given 
the growth and the size of this market, quoted and transaction prices of CDS contracts 
are widely thought to be a gauge of financial markets’ overall situation, as suggested by 
the GM/Ford credit episode in 2005, the US subprime fiasco in 2007-2009 or the 
Europe’s debt crisis in 2010. Academic and policymakers alike have voiced concerns 
with respect to the CDS market’s role in the above mentioned episodes and its possible 
influence in other financial markets, credit-oriented or otherwise. However, to properly 
address current concerns, careful empirical research is needed and therefore dependable 
CDS price data is a key requirement. The CDS market is an Over The Counter (OTC) 
market almost entirely populated by institutional investors and therefore, in contrast 
with an organized exchange like the NYSE, there are no formally established clearing 
and settlement mechanisms providing reliable information on prices. The information 
on prices must be gathered from market participants on the basis of their voluntary 
participation on periodic surveys, with all the potential shortcomings such a situation 
may bring about. For instance, Leland (2009) reports that Bloomberg’s CDS data is 
frequently revised weeks after and often disagrees substantially with other data sources 
such as Datastream. Given that price data deserve special attention, as the validity and 
power of the empirical results must be based on a dependable data source, in this study 
we investigate the differences in the main data sources employed by researchers and 
policymakers in this area. Specifically, we compare the six data sources for CDS prices 
                                                 
2 The global notional value of CDSs outstanding at the end of 2004, 2005 and 2006 was $8.42, $17.1 and 
$34.4 trillion, respectively. The CDS market exploded over the past decade to more than $45 trillion in 
mid-2007 and more than $62 trillion in the second half of the same year, according to the ISDA. The size 
of the (notional) CDS market in mid-2007 is roughly twice the size of the U.S. stock market (which is 
valued at about $22 trillion) and far exceeds the $7.1 trillion mortgage market and $4.4 trillion U.S. 
treasuries market. However, the notional amount outstanding decreased significantly during 2008 to $54.6 
trillion in mid-2008 and $38.6 trillion at the end of 2008. This declining trend followed in 2009 (31.2 in 
mid-2009 and 30.4 at the end of 2009). 
 3 
commonly used in almost all the extant research: GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, Credit 
Market Analytics (CMA) DataVision (CMA hereafter), Markit and JP Morgan. The first 
five databases are analyzed jointly for American and European firms while the JP 
Morgan data is employed additionally as a robustness test for a subset of European 
firms. 
 
In this paper we describe the databases’ main features and point out the deviations 
between them both in the cross section and in the time series dimension. We also study 
the extent to which there is an advantage, in terms of data quality, in choosing one from 
the six data sources. 
 
Two price time series for the same single name CDS reported by different data sources 
should, in principle, be very close in the sense that both share a common trend, the 
underlying true value of the asset. More specifically, their distributional characteristics 
(mean, volatility, asymmetry, and kurtosis) as well as their time series behavior 
(autocorrelations, degree of integration) should be very tightly related. Even if there are 
deviations from the common trend between the price series reported by the different 
datasets, one should expect that these deviations are non-systematic (pure measurement 
errors) and therefore unrelated both to idiosyncratic factors (firm size, industrial sector) 
and to systematic market liquidity or trading activity factors. If all the data sources are 
consistent among them, the use of a given data source should not affect the research 
results and their financial and policy implications. But if there are significant deviations 
among them, the research implications can be sensitive to the specific data base 
employed and therefore open to challenge on these grounds. Moreover, any economic 
implication gathered by investors or regulators from the academic research could be 
unduly influenced by the data source employed.  
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Therefore, there are compelling reasons to test whether the different data sources, on 
which almost all the extant empirical studies are based, are consistent among them. If 
they are not, and the divergences among them are not purely random, hitherto published 
empirical research on this matter should be viewed with considerable caution. This 
inconsistency derived from the private price’s providers would also imply a damaging 
lack of market transparency affecting all financial agents such as investors, risk 
managers, and regulators.  
 
We study the consistency of six different CDS data sources in several dimensions using 
the most liquid single name 5-year CDS of the components of the leading market 
indexes, iTraxx (European firms) and CDX (US firms). First we look at their basic 
statistical properties. Then we address two specific issues: (i) the factors explaining the 
divergences from the common trend among different CDS quoted spreads, and (ii) the 
relative informational advantage of the prices coming from different CDS databases. 
 
A summary of our results follows. As one can expect, the overall average trend is 
usually similar among databases but we find, somewhat unexpectedly, that there are 
systematic departures across databases from the common trend. In fact, if we restrict the 
comparison to the days in which we have observations in all the data sources 
simultaneously (both trades and quotes), we find that for European firms before the 
crisis, there is price information on trades in 35% of the days and, perhaps not 
coincidentally, there is, on average, a considerable degree of agreement among the 
prices provided by the different databases, although some differences can still be found 
at the individual (reference entity) level. During the crisis, there is price information on 
trades in 15% of the days, the average prices are relatively alike among databases but 
some striking differences appear at individual level and in specific time periods. 
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For US firms before the crisis, when there are recorded transactions prices from GFI on 
15% of the days, average spreads are roughly similar across databases but again some 
differences persist at firm level. However during the crisis, the percentage of days with 
information from GFI on transaction prices is only 2%, and we find that average spreads 
widen across databases, and also there is a remarkable lack of agreement at the 
individual level.  In summary, as was also the case with European firms, when there is 
enough information on transaction prices databases tend to agree among them. However 
during the crisis, US firms’ CDS spreads from different databases diverge to a larger 
extent than before the crisis. This fact implies that as the information on transaction 
prices become scarcer, prices from different sources tend to diverge from the common 
trend.  The most extreme disagreements are in the case of American firms during the 
crisis, when there is a drastic reduction in the availability of transaction prices from 
GFI. This lack of recorded transaction prices could be due to the fact that the CDS 
market in the US is based to some extent on voice transactions and to a lower extent in 
inter-dealer broker platforms such as GFI or perhaps, to the use of other platforms 
instead of GFI. 
 
If we restrict the comparison to the days in which we have no trades and simultaneous 
quotes in the corresponding data sources, we find that for European firms before the 
crisis, there is, again, a fairly large degree of agreement among the prices provided by 
the different databases. During the crisis, the average prices are similar among databases 
with some individual exceptions for specific entities and time periods.  For US entities 
before the crisis, average spreads are similar across databases but again some 
differences persist at individual level. However during the crisis, we find that average 
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spreads are less alike, volatility increases, and also there is surprisingly high variation in 
average quotes for the same reference entities coming from different databases. 
 
In summary the preliminary analysis shows that, although the different CDS quotes 
moved broadly in the same direction, there are very noticeable divergences for some 
entities in some days. Also, the discrepancies among databases appear to be more 
marked in specific time periods, probably reflecting market turbulences but it is 
important to remark that no single database provides quotes that are consistently above 
or below the quotes from other databases. We also find evidence suggesting that on 
average the days without trade information have higher quote dispersion than the days 
with trade price information. 
 
Most importantly, deviations (in absolute value) from the common trend among the 
different CDS quoted spreads are not purely random, but are related to idiosyncratic 
factors like firm size and also to liquidity, global risk and trading factors. We also find 
that the different data sources do not reflect credit risk information equally efficiently. 
Our results suggest that the CMA quoted CDS spreads led the credit risk price 
discovery process with respect to the quotes provided by other databases. All these 
results are robust to potential endogeneity or multicollinearity problems and to different 
econometric methodologies. 
 
Our results have a number of important implications for empirical research using CDS 
prices. First, for US names with low trade frequency, our results cast doubts on the 
reliability of the existing price information because there are very few recorded trade 
prices in GFI. Thus, conclusions obtained in papers that have used these data are open, 
to some extent, to criticism on these grounds.  Second, in studies of price discovery of 
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the CDS market in relation to other markets such as bonds or futures, empirical results 
may change depending on the database employed. In particular since there is a data 
source (CMA) which seems to lead the others.  For instance, Zhu (2006) using Markit 
data found that the CDS market and the bond market appear to be equally important in 
the incorporation of new information. Would this result hold if CMA data is used 
instead of Markit data?  Third, the smaller the firm, the lower the market’s liquidity and, 
the highest the VIX volatility index, the larger are the deviations from the common 
trend in prices across the different databases, and therefore, the less reliable and 
comparable research results might be. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. Section 3 
describes the data employed in the analysis. Section 4 motivates the research hypotheses 
and introduces the methodology. Section 5 shows the empirical results while Section 6 
confirms the robustness of the results and presents some extensions. Section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of comparing alternative financial databases is stressed in the classical 
papers by Rosenberg and Houglet (1974) and Bennin (1980) on the differences between 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT stock price data. However, in more recent times there are 
very few papers comparing databases. Schoar (2002) and Villalonga (2004) compare 
COMPUSTAT with the Longitudinal Research Database and the Business Information 
Tracking Series from the U.S Bureau of the Census, respectively, and show that 
different data sources have large impact on the answers to research questions. Despite 
the widespread use of CDS databases and the high relevance of their accuracy, to the 
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best of our knowledge there exists no study that examines or compares data as well as 
databases. Our paper is a first attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
 
The first papers that compare, at least to some extent, different CDS data sources are 
Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti 
(2009). However, this comparison is not the main focus of their paper and these authors 
do not present a detailed analysis. They simply conduct a test to ensure consistency 
between the CMA and GFI CDS spreads series over a short period when there was an 
overlap between the two series. They develop this test just to match GFI and CMA 
series and create a longer dataset given that they have the two data sources for different 
periods. Moreover, they do not report any results of the tests and simply state that they 
find consistency.  
 
Mayordomo, Peña and Romo (2009) employ four different data sources (GFI, CMA, 
Reuters EOD and JP Morgan) to study the existence of arbitrage opportunities in credit 
derivatives markets focusing their attention to the single names CDSs and asset swaps. 
Although they find similar results employing any of the four previous data sources at 
the aggregate level, some differences appear at the individual reference entity level. 
They report their base results using the GFI’s traded CDSs but when they use the other 
data sources they do not find exactly the same number of arbitrage opportunities. That 
is, for some individual firms they find arbitrage opportunities using GFI but they do not 
find them using some of the other data sources. In some other cases they also find the 
opposite. 
 
The Mayordomo et al. (2009) study above suggests that the differences in CDS prices 
from different databases can have a material influence on research results and therefore 
a careful analysis of the publicly accessible databases is called for. In fact, the problem 
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could be potentially even more serious when researchers work with “unique” databases 
coming from a single dealer’s quotes (contributor) and without crosschecking. It is 
important to emphasize that we use a broad array of CDS data sources where, for most 
of them, prices are put together based on information provided by several market traders 
and dealers. Using aggregate prices we focus on the market factors or characteristics 
that could affect the consistency among quoted prices. Thus, instead of using individual 
dealer’s prices we use aggregated (composite/consensus) prices which allow us to have 
a more comprehensive perspective on the market. 
 
The only previous paper that employs different CDS prices (trades and quotes) is Arora, 
Gandhi and Longstaff (2010). They examine how counterparty credit risk affects the 
pricing of CDS contracts using a proprietary data set. Specifically, their data set spans 
from March 2008 to January 2009 and includes contemporaneous CDS transaction 
prices and quotations provided by 14 large CDS dealers for selling protection on the 
same set of underlying reference firms. The authors find that there are differences across 
dealers in how counterparty credit risk is priced. That is, counterparty credit risk is not 
priced symmetrically across dealers and they consider that these asymmetries could be 
due to differences in the microstructure and legal framework of the CDS market. They 
argue that dealers may behave strategically in terms of their offers to sell credit 
protection. 
 
We use aggregate data, which are formed after grouping the information of the market 
traders and dealers instead of individual dealer prices, to study the potential divergence 
among the composite CDS spreads. By concentrating on the aggregate prices we focus 
on the market factors or characteristics that could affect the consistency among quoted 
prices but we do not try to explain the effect of potential differences among the 
individual dealers. As Arora, et al. (2010) sustain, the decentralized nature of the CDS 
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markets makes the transaction prices somewhat difficult to observe. This is why most 
empirical research analyses based on the CDS markets use price quotes instead of 
transaction prices.  
 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) argue that the composite prices include quotations 
from a variety of credit derivatives dealers and therefore, these quotations should be 
representative of the entire credit derivatives market. We complement our analysis using 
also GFI transaction prices and Fenics prices (elaborated by GFI) which are based on a 
combination of transaction and judgmental prices, the latter computed using the Hull 
and White methodology and therefore not dependent on contributors.3 
 
 
3. Data 
The six publicly available data sources that we employ in this paper are GFI, Fenics, 
Reuters EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan. As was mentioned above, the first five 
databases are analyzed jointly and JP Morgan data is employed additionally as a 
robustness test for the European firms given that we do not have JP Morgan data for the 
American firms.  
• GFI, which provides traded CDS spreads, is a major inter-dealer broker (IDB) 
specializing in the trading of credit derivatives. GFI data contain single name 
CDS transaction prices for 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years maturities.  They are not 
consensus or indicative prices.4 Thus, these prices are an accurate indication of 
where the CDS markets traded and closed for a given day. GFI data have been 
                                                 
3 As explained in Section 3, we also use an additional single sources data (JP Morgan). JP Morgan data 
refer to individual dealer’s prices and we use them in the robustness analysis.  
4 Consensus and indicative data are trusted less nowadays given the increased market’s volatility. There 
exist differences of up to 100% between consensus prices from leading providers compared to actual 
trades on GFI systems. The reason is that consensus process is inherently slow and the prices originate 
from back office staff which can be swayed by the positions they already hold in their books, and also 
perhaps because they do not have a front office’s market view. 
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used by Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Predescu (2006), Saita (2006), 
Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007), Fulop and Lescourret (2007), or 
Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and Mahanti (2009) among others. 
• Fenics (elaborated by GFI) data are a mixture of traded, quoted and estimated 
CDS spreads. Fenics’ data are credit curves for the whole term structure of 
maturities, generated hourly (all trading days) for more than 1900 reference 
entities. Data points in a given name’s credit curve can be actual trades or mid 
prices calculated from the bid/offer quotes. If there are no market references, the 
Fenics CDS spread is computed using the Hull and White methodology to 
ensure that a credit curve always exists for each reference entity.5 Fenics data 
have been used in Mayordomo et al. (2009) among others6. 
• Reuters EOD provides CDS composite prices.  Reuters takes CDS quotes each 
day from over 30 contributors around the world and offers end of day data for 
single names CDSs. Before computing a daily composite spread, it applies a 
rigorous screening procedure to eliminate outliers or doubtful data. Mayordomo 
et al. (2009), among others, employ CDSs data from Reuters. 
• Credit Market Analytics (CMA) DataVision reports consensus data (bid, ask and 
mid) sourced from 30 buy-side firms, including major global Investment Banks, 
Hedge Funds, and Asset Managers. Among the papers that employ CMA data 
are Nashikkar and Subrahmanyam (2007) and Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and 
Mahanti (2009). 
                                                 
5 Although Fenics is computed using the approximations mentioned above, it is a reasonably accurate 
data source. For instance, the median of the absolute difference in basis points between five years CDS 
premiums as defined by Fenics and the actual quotes or transaction prices registered in other databases for 
the period between April 2001 and May 2002, is equal to 1.16, 2.01 and 3.82 bps for AAA/AA, A and 
BBB ratings for a total of 2,659, 9,585 and 8,170 companies respectively.  
6 GFI is a broker which also reports the Fenics prices. The data reported by GFI are transactions prices or 
bid/quotes in which capital is actually committed. This data is only available when there is a trade. When 
there is not, GFI constructs the Fenics curve which is available daily with no gaps. To compute the Fenics 
curve, GFI uses its own information on transactions or quotes. If for a given day neither prices nor quotes 
are available, Fenics data is computed by means of Hull and White’s methodology. 
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• Markit provides composite prices. The Markit Group collects more than a 
million CDS quotes contributed by more than 30 major market participants on a 
daily basis. The quotes are subject to filtering that removes outliers and stale 
observations. Markit then computes a daily composite spread only if it has two 
or more contributors. Once Markit starts pricing a CDS contract, data will be 
available on a continuous basis, although there may be missing observations in 
the data. Markit is one of the most widely employed dataset. Papers that employ 
this dataset include:  Acharya and Johnson (2007), Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009), 
Jorion and Zhang (2007), Jorian and Zhang (200), Zhu (2006), Micu et al. 
(2004), and Cao, Yu, and Zhong (2010). 
• Our last database is J.P. Morgan quotes. It contains mid-market data provided by 
J. P. Morgan which is one of the leading players and most active traders in the 
CDS market. The data from J.P. Morgan is employed for a subgroup of 
European firms as part of the robustness tests (data is not available for US 
firms). This dataset is employed in Aunon-Nerin, Cossin, Hricko, and Huang 
(2002), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), and Chen, Cheng, and Liu (2008) 
among others. 
To summarize, three of the data sources (Reuters EOD, CMA and Markit) employ data 
from a variety of contributors (over 30 potential dealers/traders) to report composite 
prices. GFI reports traded CDS spreads. Fenics is a mixture of traded, quoted and 
calculated CDS spreads all of them based on the same data source and without 
depending on contributors. Finally, the last data source is obtained from one of the most 
active traders in the CDS market (JP Morgan) and reports mid-quoted prices obtained 
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from their own traders. Thus, the information reported by Reuters EOD, CMA and 
Markit could also include the information of JP Morgan’s quoted CDS spreads7. 
 
 
For our analysis we use US firms included in the CDX index, as well as European firms 
included in the iTraxx index. At any point in time, both the CDX and iTraxx indexes 
contain 125 names each but the composition of the indexes changes every six months. 
We do not use all the single names CDSs in these indexes but concentrate on the most 
liquid single names CDSs. As in Christoffersen, Ericsson, Jacobs, and Xisong (2009) 
we use only the single name CDSs which constitute the iTraxx and CDX indexes over 
the whole sample period which spans from January 2004 to March 2010. We end up 
with 47 (43) firms which stay in the iTraxx (CDX) index during the whole sample 
period and for which we are able to obtain equity price information8. We guarantee a 
minimum consistency between the single name CDS spread obtained from the different 
data sources by requiring that all of them have the same maturity (5-year), currency 
denomination (Euros for the European and US Dollars for the American CDSs), 
seniority (senior CDS spreads), and restructuring clause (Modified-Modified 
Restructuring for the European and Modified Restructuring for the American CDSs). 
 
                                                 
7 CMA and GFI span from January 1, 2004 to March 29, 2010 for all firms. Markit spans from January 1, 
2004 to December 8, 2009 for all firms. Fenics spans from January 1, 2004 to June 3, 2009 for most of 
the firms and from January 1, 2004 to March 29, 2010 in the remaining seven firms. Reuters spans from 
December 3, 2007 to March 29, 2010. JP Morgan spans from January 1, 2005 to August 13, 2009. For 
this reason, in the robustness test in which we add JP Morgan data we limit the length of our sample from 
January 1, 2005 to August 13, 2009 to focus in the cases in which we have observations from JP Morgan. 
8  It could be argued that this selection procedure could introduce some survivorship bias in our sample. It 
should be noted that the components of the indexes are investment grade CDSs firms which are the most 
actively traded names in the six months prior to the index roll. If in a given period a single name CDS is 
excluded from the index it is not necessary due to the fact that the firm enters financial distress but simply 
because of liquidity reasons. On the other hand if a name is downgraded to non-investment it is, of 
course, excluded from the index. Notice however that one should expect that the agreement among 
databases on the CDS price for a given name should be higher for the most liquid names. Thus, this 
possible survivorship bias will tend to make the prices from different databases more in agreement than 
they are in fact. Consequently if we find significant disagreement among prices from different sources, 
the empirical evidence is even more compelling. 
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As we said before, two price time series for the same financial instrument reported by 
different data sources should, in principle, be very close. To provide a telling illustration 
that this is not necessarily the case for CDS contracts, Figure 1 depicts 5-year CDS 
quotes from Reuters, Fenics, Markit and CMA for two European entities (AXA and 
Hannover) and for two US entities (Baxter and Dominion Resources). The sample 
period is from September 1, 2008 to January 1, 2009.  Four notable features emerge 
from the figures (which can be deemed as typical behavior for firms over this time 
period). First, although the different CDS quotes moved broadly in the same direction, 
there are very noticeable divergences in a given day. For instance on October 10, 2008 
the following quotes for AXA were reported: CMA 247 b.p., Markit 229 b.p., Fenics 
193 b.p. and Reuters 191 b.p., implying a difference around 30% between the highest 
and the lowest quote.  Similar disagreements can be observed in the other three entities. 
Second, the discrepancies among databases appear to be more marked in specific time 
periods, probably reflecting market turbulences.  The first week of October 2008 
(Dominion, Hannover, AXA) or the first week of December 2009 (Baxter) is a case in 
point. Third, no single database provides quotes that are consistently above or below the 
quotes from other databases. Fourth, the speed of adjustment to market news is not the 
same across databases as the case of Dominion at the end of September 2008 or the case 
of Hannover at mid-October 2008 suggest. In both cases, the Fenics quotes reacted to 
market events in a different way than the other three databases.  
 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics for the single name CDS of the firms that 
we study, for the first five databases: GFI, Fenics, Reuters EOD, CMA, and Markit. We 
report statistics on Number of Trades or Quotes, Number of Trades or Quotes per day, 
Mean, Standard Deviation, Median, Skewness and Kurtosis of the CDS spreads as well 
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as the coefficient of the AR(1) based on the CDS spreads.  In Panel A we report the 
names classified by index and sector for both the American and European firms.  
 
Panels B, C, D, E, and F, provide the CDS descriptive statistics for the European single 
name CDSs. The information is divided for the periods before and during the financial 
crisis to make easier potential comparisons among data sources in these two periods. 
Each of the five previous panels corresponds to a different data source. Panel B reports 
the CDS traded spreads information obtain from GFI while Panels C, D, E, and F 
provide the information obtain from CMA, Markit, Fenics, and Reuters EOD, 
respectively. Before the crisis there is price information on trades in 35% of the days 
and there is, on average, a considerable degree of agreement among the prices provided 
by the different databases. The asymmetry is always positive and there is a high degree 
of persistence with first order autocorrelation coefficient near one in all cases. However 
there are a few cases where some noteworthy differences can be found.  
 
During the crisis however there is information on transaction prices only in 15% of the 
days. The skewness is usually positive but there are some noticeable differences in 
persistence: GFI prices are clearly less persistent (0.83) than the quotes from the other 
databases. In fact, all the names which trade less than the 10% of the days have first-
order autocorrelation coefficients around 0.6.  One important implication of this is that 
unit root test based on an AR(1) specification will tend to give different results, 
rejecting non-stationarity for GFI data (especially in the cases of low trade frequency 
names) but not rejecting it for the other databases. The discrepancies, even in the cases 
in which a comparable number of observations across the different data sources are 
available, are much more frequent and more remarkable as the cases of PPR, Volvo, 
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Enel and some others suggest. Specifically, in the case of Volvo there is a difference of 
33 b. p. between the highest average price (Reuters, 253b.p.) and the lowest (CMA, 220 
b.p.). Other discrepancies are found even between the datasets (CMA and Markit) with 
more similar quotes, as in the cases of PPR (16 b.p.) and Enel (9 b.p.). 
 
Panels G, H, I, J, and K, provide the CDS descriptive statistics for the American single 
name CDSs. As in the European case, the information is divided for the periods before 
and during the crisis. Panel G reports the information obtained from GFI while Panels 
H, I, J, and K provide the information obtain from CMA, Markit, Fenics, and Reuters 
EOD, respectively. Before the crisis there is price information on trades in 15% of the 
days and there is, on average, a fair amount of agreement among the prices provided by 
the different databases. The skewness is always positive but with a fair degree of 
variation from 0.72 for Fenics to 0.06 for GFI. In all cases there is a high degree of 
persistence with first order autocorrelation coefficient near one. However, as is the case 
with European firms, there are a few names with a relatively similar number of 
observations where some salient differences can be found. Before the crisis, Cigna’s 
CDS quoted spreads obtained from Fenics are more than 30% higher than CMA and 
Markit quotes. On the other hand, General Electric’s CDS spreads obtained from Fenics 
are 62% lower than the ones obtained from CMA and Markit.  
 
Transaction prices are only available in 2% of the days during the crisis, and the 
discrepancies are both more frequent and more remarkable. For instance in the case of 
American International Group there is a difference of 111 b.p. between the Reuters 
quote (825 b.p.) and the CMA quote (714 b.p.) and 80 b.p. between the Reuters quote 
(815 b.p.) and the Markit quote (745 b.p.). Other notable disagreements between the 
highest and the lowest prices in names with a relatively similar number of observations 
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across the different data sources are found for Comcast (the average difference between 
Markit and Reuters CDS spreads is 61 b.p.), General Electric (the average difference 
between CMA and Reuters is 34 b.p.), and XL Capital (the average difference between 
CMA and Reuters is 57 b.p. and between CMA and Markit 34 b.p.), among others. The 
GFI transaction data is less persistent than the quoted prices from the other databases. 
Therefore, the implications for unit root test also apply to US entities. In summary, the 
preliminary analysis suggests that the crisis has had a strong effect on the degree of 
disagreement of the different databases in several individual reference entities, and 
especially so for US names 
 
As the actual sample size of the different data sources differ (because of missing values 
and slightly different periods covered), we report aggregated summary statistics for all 
observations in Panel L, in Panel M for the cases in which we have common 
observations (trades and quotes) in all the data sources, and in Panel N for the cases in 
which there is no trade but there are quotes in all the data sources. The implications one 
may gather from these panels are relevant for assessing the degree of databases’ overall 
agreement in the common average trend. As expected, for European firms before the 
crisis the common trend is readily apparent in the prices provided by the different 
databases in the three panels. During the crisis, there are some discrepancies in the 
average values and in the volatilities in Panel L. In Panels M and N there are few 
discrepancies but it is interesting to remark that averages and volatilities are lower in 
Panel M than in Panel N suggesting that average quotes tend to be higher and more 
volatile in the days where there are no transaction prices available. 
 
For US firms before the crisis the common trend is also readily apparent. However 
during the crisis, there are many quite remarkable discrepancies in the average values 
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and in the volatilities in Panel L. In Panels M and N there are also discrepancies but it is 
worth noting that, as it was also the case with the European firms, averages and 
volatilities are lower in Panel M than in Panel N reinforcing the above suggestion that 
average quotes tend to be higher and more volatile in the days where there are no 
transaction prices available. 
 
We should emphasize that the total aggregate descriptive statistics across all the firms, 
which are reported in Panels L, M and N, do not provide information about potential 
discrepancies at the individual reference entity level or in a given date. That is, although 
the total averages are in most cases fairly close, there could be some noteworthy 
discrepancies both at the entity (as the preliminary analysis above suggest) and also at 
the cross-sectional level that cannot be captured by these statistics.  
 
To clarify this point, we first compute the absolute value of the average difference 
across pairs of data sources9 (CMA - Markit, CMA - Fenics, CMA - Reuters, Markit - 
Fenics, Markit - Reuters, Fenics – Reuters) and then divide it by the average CDS 
spread across the four previous data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, and Reuters) for 
each firm every day. Then, we calculate the average of the previous series every day 
across the total number of firms. This is the Data Sources’ Average Absolute 
Discrepancies (AAD) time series.  The AAD time series is shown in Figure 2 for days 
with trades (Trade) and for days without trades (No Trade).  The average value of Trade 
is 0.031 and its volatility is 0.021. The average value of No Trade is 0.053 and its 
volatility is 0.017. The two sample unpooled t-test with unequal variances has a t-
statistic of 33.68 under the null of equal means, suggesting that on average the days 
without trade information have higher quote dispersion. The AAD series show a very 
                                                 
9 GFI data is not used due to the scarcity of transaction prices during the crisis. 
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dynamic behaviour, with some noticeably turbulent episodes, for instance in 2005 given 
the impact of the crisis experienced by General Motors (GM) and Ford in May 2005 on 
the credit default swap (CDS) market. Both firms’ CDS premia increased sharply just 
before the downgrading of their credit ratings in May 2005. All other CDS premia also 
rose markedly during this period for US and European firms. The more salient episodes 
in the AAD series are in September 2008 in the days surrounding the Lehman Brothers 
collapse when the AAD took its highest value to date (10%).  In summary the data 
suggest that discrepancies from the common trend among databases are persistent and 
related with market-wide significant episodes. We address the modelling of these 
discrepancies in Section 4. 
 
Additionally, in Panels O and P of Table 1 we report the unit root test for all CDS 
names in our sample, computed using the quotes time series whenever we have quotes 
in the four data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, and Reuters EOD) at the same time.10 
 
 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the distribution of the quoted and the traded CDS 
spreads referencing the firms in Table 1. Panel A provides the distribution of the 
number of quoted spreads on a given day for a single name CDS through the four data 
sources (CMA, Markit, Reuters and Fenics). Panel B reports the distribution of the 
range of the mean absolute difference, in basis points, among all the possible pairs of 
quoted spreads from the previous data sources on a given day for a single CDS. Panel C 
provides the distribution of the range of the mean absolute difference, in basis points, 
between all the possible pairs formed by the GFI traded CDS spread and one of the 
                                                 
10 We do not report the unit root test for GFI given the low number of observations available, which limits 
the comparison among the quoted CDS spreads which include more observations than the traded ones, 
and also due the consequent test’s low power, see Shiller and Perron (1985). Actually, in the US sample 
we cannot test the existence of a unit root due to lack of trades. 
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different quoted CDS spreads. In almost 80% of the cases we observe the CDS spread 
on a given firm at least in three different data sources. The mean absolute difference 
among the different data sources is higher than one basis point in 55.3% of the cases 
and it is higher than five basis points in 13.3% of the cases. The mean absolute 
difference among the traded CDS spread on one hand and the quoted CDS on the other 
hand (Panel C of Table 2) is slightly higher than the mean differences observed in Panel 
B of Table 2. Actually the mean difference is smaller than one basis point in 40.9% of 
the cases.   
 
 
 
4. Research Hypotheses and Methodology  
The main analysis of the data is based on two testable hypotheses. These hypotheses 
and the methodology employed to perform the empirical tests are detailed in this 
section. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The volatility of the deviations from the common trend of the quoted 
prices provided by the different CDS data sources is not related to systematic factors. 
 
In other words, large deviations (in absolute value) from the common trend appear 
randomly among databases and are unrelated with risk and liquidity factors (global or 
idiosyncratic). The test of Hypothesis 1 is based on a regression in which the dependent 
variable is the logarithm of the standard deviation of the 5-year quoted CDS spreads 
reported by the different data sources which is denoted by log(sd(CDS))i,t This variable 
is computed with the j available CDS quoted spreads (j = 1,..,4  where 1= CMA, 2 = 
Markit, 3 = Reuters and 4 = Fenics) for a given underlying firm i (i = 1,..,90) on every 
date t as follows: )))]/1([/1log(())(log( 5.02
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n is the number of data sources from which we observe CDS spreads, with the 
maximum n equal four whenever CMA, Markit, Reuters and Fenics report the CDS 
spreads for firm i at time t. 
 
By defining the dependent variable in this way11 we get rid of the common trend (the 
average) and concentrate on the deviations from the common trend. The regression 
equation is as follows: 
)1())(log( ,,,, titikti uXCDSsd +′+= βα  
 
 where the vector tikX ,,  includes  k explanatory variables: the logarithm of the firm 
market capitalization, a trade dummy, the number of days without a trade, the 
interaction of the number of days without a trade one day ago and the trade dummy , the 
CDS bid-ask spread, the VIX Index and a number of databases dummy.12  The vector 
β ′  includes the regression coefficients corresponding to these k variables while the 
parameter α  is the intercept of the regression. The residual term is denoted by tiu , . The 
trade dummy is equal to one if there is a trade in the GFI platform at the current date in 
the 5-year maturity contract, and zero otherwise. 13 The number of days without a trade 
variable measures the number of days without a trade up to the current date. The 
interaction variable is constructed as the interaction between the number of days without 
a transaction up to one day ago and the trade dummy. The last variable intends to give 
an indication about how many data points were used to compute the dependent variable 
and is a dummy which equals one when all, or all minus one, of the data sources report 
                                                 
11 We take logs to induce the data to meet the assumptions of the regression method that is to be applied; 
because the distribution of the standard deviation variable is strongly right skewed (the skewness of the 
original series is 25.10 while the skewness of the log series is 0.21).  
12 Hausman’s test rejects the random effects specification in favor of a fixed-effects specification, 
with a p-value of 0.05. 
13 We are considering trades for the 5-year maturity contract only given that the number of trades in the 
other maturity contracts is very low. The total number of trades according to GFI information during the 
sample period and for the firms that we consider is 26,126 while the number of trades which occurred in 
the other maturities (1 and 3 years contracts) is 1,100 confirming that the most liquid contract is the 5-
year CDS contract. 
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a price.14 If the null hypothesis is true no significant coefficients should be found in 
equation (1) because differences in price dispersion between databases should be purely 
random. 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The different data sources reflect credit risk information equally 
efficiently or, equivalently, all databases contribute equally to the price discovery 
process. Given that transaction prices are very scarce for some firms, only quoted prices 
are employed and therefore the comparison is among CMA, Markit, Fenics and Reuters. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2 we employ the Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) model which is 
based on the following Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) specification and it is 
used to study the effectiveness of the different data sources in terms of price discovery: 
)3(
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where equation (3) is formed by a vector autoregressive (VAR) system formed by two 
equations defined from the vector  Xt which includes a pair of CDS quotes or prices of 
the same underlying firm from two different databases and an error correction term 
which is defined by the product 1−′ tXβ  where β’ = (1− β2 − β3 )  are estimated in an 
auxiliary cointegration regression. The series for the pair of CDS prices included in 1−tX  
must be cointegrated to develop this analysis and the cointegrating relation is defined by 
)( 1,321,1 −−− −−=′ tBSOURCEtASOURCEt CDSCDSX βββ which can be interpreted as the long-
run equilibrium. The parameter vector α’ =(α1 , α2 ) contains the error correction 
coefficients measuring each price’s expected speed in eliminating the price difference 
and it is the base of the price discovery metrics. The parameter vector 
iΓ  for i= 1,..p, 
                                                 
14 We do not employ values from zero to four given that we only have observations on Reuters EOD after 
December 2007 which is very close to the beginning of the crisis and may reflect something different to 
what we want to study in this paper. 
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with p indicating the total number of lags, contains the coefficients of the VAR system 
measuring the effect of the lagged first difference in the pair of CDS quotes on the first 
different of such quotes at time t.15   Finally, ut denotes a white noise vector. The 
percentages of price discovery of the CDS quote i (where i =1, 2) can be defined from 
the following metrics GGi, i=1,2 which are based on the elements of the vector α’: 
)4(;
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The vector α’ contains the coefficients that determine each market’s contribution to 
price discovery. Thus, given that GG1+GG2=1 we conclude that market 1 leads the 
process of price discovery with respect to market 2 whenever market 1 price discovery 
metric GG1 is higher than 0.5. If the null hypothesis is true (no dominant market) the 
percentage of price discovery will be the same for the names from all databases and 
equal to 0.5. We estimate the price discovery metric for each firm using pairs of CDS 
spreads and then test whether the average price discovery metric is significantly higher 
than 0.5 using the mean t-statistic: 
metricsPDMetricsDevStd
PDMetricsMean
stattMean
#/)(.
)5.0)(( −
=− , 
where # metrics denotes the number of firms for which it is estimated the price 
discovery metric from a given pair of CDS spreads. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Regression Results: Hypothesis 1 
  
Table 3 reports the average time-series correlations among dependent and explanatory 
variables in equation (1). The variables with a highest correlation with the dependent 
variable are the CDS bid-ask spread (0.414) and the VIX Index (0.456). The highest 
                                                 
15 The optimal number of lags is determined by means of the Schwarz information criteria. 
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correlation among explanatory variables is also the one between the CDS bid-ask spread 
and the VIX Index (0.480). Our main objective, however, is to examine the joint effect 
of these explanatory variables on the dispersion among the CDS spreads obtained from 
the different data sources. 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results obtained from fitting equation (1) to data from the 
five databases. Column 1 reports the results for the whole sample whereas Column 2 
reports the results for European firms and Column 3 for US firms. Negative and 
significant coefficients for the explanatory variable measuring size (log (market cap)) 
are found suggesting that the CDS prices for large firms tend to be more in agreement 
among databases than the prices for small firms. Or in other words, the volatility of the 
deviations from the common trend is lower for large firms. This effect is also noticeably 
stronger for US firms. The coefficients for the explanatory dummy variable “trade” are 
negative and significant suggesting that when there are transaction prices available for a 
given day, the quotes from different contributors tend to agree more closely. This is in 
agreement with the results on basic statistical properties summarized in the Section 5.1 
above. Consequently, the positive (but only significant for US firms) effect found for 
the variable days w/o trade implies that the longer the period without transaction price 
information, the greater the disagreement among quotes because, the weaker is the 
referential value of the previous price.  The interaction between the trade dummy and 
the number of days without a trade one day ago has a negative sign (but non-significant 
for European firms) indicating that the effect of the trade is more influential when the 
number of days without price trade information is larger.16 
 
                                                 
16 One possible explanation is that traders will pay more attention to the new information reported by GFI 
when there has been no recorded trading activity for some time. 
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Regarding the liquidity variable, the bid-ask spread, has, as expected, positive and 
significant coefficients implying that the more illiquid is the market, the more difficult 
is to infer appropriate prices and the higher are the deviations from the common trend 
among the different data sources. The effect of the VIX index is positive and significant. 
The higher the global risk, the higher the dispersion from the common trend among 
individual CDS spreads. 17, 18 
 
The dummy variable Max Quotes is equal to one when at least three data sources report 
a price and zero otherwise. The intuition is that the higher the number of quotes 
employed to calculate the cross-sectional standard deviation, the higher should this 
standard deviation be. This variable is significant and has a positive sign as expected. 
  
To summarize, the empirical evidence strongly rejects Hypothesis 1. The volatility of 
the deviations from the common trend of the quoted prices provided by the different 
CDS data sources is not random but related to systematic factors. In other words, large 
deviations (in absolute value) from the common trend among databases do not appear 
randomly but are significantly related with risk and liquidity factors. The economic 
implication of this result is that, in specific market circumstances, the deviations of the 
prices from the common trend will tend to grow on average. Some prices will be closer 
to the trend and some prices will be far away from it but the average distance between 
them will increase, making the prices less homogeneous and making it more difficult 
for agents to asses the CDS fair value and for researcher using the data to decide what 
database gives the market prices’ most reliable account. Also, model (1) does a pretty 
                                                 
17 These variables should not cause any collinearity problem given that the correlation is 0.480. However, 
we further investigate this aspect and others regarding potential endogeneity problems derived from the 
use of the VIX and CDS liquidity variables in the robustness test section. 
18 Our results do not change materially when we proxy the global risk measure by means of the VDAX 
Index, the difference between LIBOR  and Treasury Bill, the CDS indexes (iTraxx and CDX) or the 
square of the MSCI Index returns instead of the VIX index. 
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good job in explaining the dispersion among prices for the overall sample as measured 
by the R2 (48%), and also for the European (37%) and US (46%) samples.19 
 
As the bulk of the CDS spreads that we employ in our analysis are based on the 
information revealed by the traders or dealers, it is possible that the degree of 
divergence among the different data sources may be influenced by the number of 
contributors which are reporting quoted or traded CDS spreads. In an extreme case in 
which all the composite prices are constructed using the same group of contributors, the 
prices should be very similar and the volatility of the deviations from the common trend 
should be close to zero. The problem is that we do not have access to the identity of the 
contributors that are reporting prices to the different data sources. However, we have 
access to the number of contributors that are reporting prices to Markit for the 5-year 
CDS spread. The different data sources may have different contributors but there should 
be some common group of contributors which presumably are the most influential 
traders and for that reason the most active agents in terms of contributed prices. 
Moreover, there could be other contributors whose participation is less significant in the 
sense that they report prices less frequently, or they could report prices to a few data 
sources but not to the others. This could imply that when the number of contributors is 
small the prices might be provided by the most influential and active traders which, on 
the other hand, could be common to all the data sources. Therefore, we conjecture that 
the lower the number of contributors, the higher should be the importance of the 
common contributors and the lower the divergence from the common trend among the 
different data sources. To test this conjecture we include the variable “number of 
                                                 
19 We also performed separate analysis before and during the crisis. We find that the explanatory 
variables referred to the trades are not significant before the crisis but they are significant and with the 
same signs as reported in Table 4 for the crisis period. We also considered the use of a crisis dummy but 
since the liquidity is much lower during the crisis and the number of trades in US is much lower during 
that period the use of the crisis dummy may cloud the effect of some of the potential explanatory 
variables that we use. Moreover, we use the VIX as a potential proxy for times of financial distress 
 27 
contributors” as an additional explanatory variable in equation (1) and run the 
corresponding regression. The results are shown in Column (2) of Table 5; Column (1) 
repeats the benchmark results from Table 4 for comparison purposes. The coefficient on 
the number of contributors is positive and significant which is consistent with our 
conjecture on the effect of the number of contributors. The coefficients for the 
remaining variables do not change materially in sign or in magnitude with respect to the 
ones obtained in the baseline regression (Column (1) of Table 5). 
 
To test if these results are affected by possible collinearity due to the relatively high 
correlation between both the CDS bid-ask spread and the VIX Index with the number of 
contributors (-0.212 and -0.361, respectively) we repeat the previous regression but 
using as explanatory variable the residual of the regression of the number of 
contributors onto the VIX Index and the CDS bid-ask spread. The residual proxies the 
number of contributors net of the global risk and the illiquidity effect in the CDS 
market. These results are shown in Column (3) of Table 5.20 The results are almost 
identical to the ones observed in Column (2) and consistent with our conjecture on the 
effect of the most relevant contributors, and also that collinearity between the three 
previous variables is not a serious issue in our case.  
 
It should be mentioned that transactions are not necessarily made through the GFI 
platform, but they could occur in any other platform. The advantage of GFI data is not 
that it includes all the CDS contracts traded but that it is a transparent source in which 
the market participants can observe real transaction prices and not just quotes. Although 
there is no available data for all the transaction prices since the beginning of our whole 
sample, we can employ an additional information source for a shorter time period; 
                                                 
20 In order to estimate the coefficients presented in Column (3) of Table 5 we use the bootstrap 
methodology to correct any potential bias in the standard errors due to the use of a generated regressor. 
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namely, a “trade information warehouse” that captures the majority of information on 
CDS trades covering corporate and sovereign borrowers. This warehouse is established 
by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) which keeps a record of 
outstanding CDSs involving major dealers as counterparties. According to the DTCC 
calculations around 90-95% of the CDS trades are settled and confirmed through them. 
The DTCC does not provide all the trade details, which are private information, but it 
reports weekly data on the gross and net exposures and the number of CDS outstanding 
contracts on 1,000 corporate and sovereign borrowers. We have this weekly information 
for the 90 firms that constitute our sample from the 7th of November, 2008 to the last 
sample date (the 29th of March, 2010). 
 
To test for the importance of trades in the deviations of the CDS prices, we substitute 
the trading controls employed in equation (1) by a weekly variable which reports the 
total number of outstanding CDS contracts traded on a given reference firm. This allows 
us to control for both the cumulative information on a given firm attending to the total 
number of contracts and the trend in trading activity. The hypothesis to test is if a higher 
number of CDS contacts traded on a given reference firm lowers the volatility of the 
deviations from the common trend across data sources. We find that the total number of 
CDS contracts traded on a reference firm has a significant and negative effect on the 
dispersion between data sources while the sings and levels of significance of the other 
variables remain unchanged with respect to the ones observed in the baseline regression 
results (Column (1) of Table 4). The implication of this is that the higher the market 
activity, the lower is the volatility of the deviations from the common trend of the 
quoted prices provided by the different CDS data sources. This fact is obviously at odds 
with Hypothesis 1 being true.  Additionally, given that we are employing daily 
information but this variable is constructed on a weekly frequency, we lagged the 
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variable one week and obtain a significant negative coefficient on that variable while 
the signs and the significance of the other variables remain unchanged. We also use the 
number of weekly traded contracts, lagged one week, instead of the total number of 
outstanding traded contracts and obtain similar results.21 
 
 
5.3 Regression Results: Hypothesis 2 
 
Table 6 reports the results of testing Hypothesis 2 on price discovery analysis using 
quoted prices (transaction prices are too scarce to be included in the analysis). A 
statistical significance test for the null hypothesis that the estimated price discovery 
proportions GGi are equal to 0.5, is also included.  The test rejects the null in all cases 
with the exception of CMA vs Markit in Europe and Fenics vs Reuters also in Europe.   
Therefore in these two cases both databases contribute equally to the price discovery 
process. However, in all other cases the results indicate that there is a leader database 
and a follower database. CMA is the data source that contributes to a higher extent to 
the “formation of prices” with newer and more influential information, especially for 
the total sample and for the US sample, followed by Markit. As mentioned above, for 
European firms CMA and Markit are almost equally informative in terms of price 
discovery. The less informative database in this realm seems to be Fenics. The results 
strongly reject the hypothesis that the price discovery process is evenly spread among 
data bases, and therefore Hypothesis 2 is not supported by the data.  
 
 
 
6. Robustness Tests and Extensions 
In this section, we report the results of several checks of the test of Hypothesis 1 
presented in Table 4. First, we deal with potential problems of endogeneity and 
                                                 
21 Detailed results are available upon request. 
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multicollinearity. Second, we repeat the previous analysis for a sub sample of European 
firms and adding a new data source: JP Morgan. Third, we consider alternative 
econometric techniques: pooled regressions and Prais-Winsten regressions after filling 
the missing observations. Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of the results to different 
data transformations: (i) using as the dependent variable the ratio between the logarithm 
of the standard deviation of the CDS quotes and the logarithm of mean CDS spread; (ii) 
excluding first the Reuters EOD quotes and second the Fenics quotes; (iii) limiting the 
sample period up to December 2009, June 2009 and December 2007;22 (iv) using single 
source datasets constructed without aggregating data (Fenics/GFI and JPMorgan); and 
(v) grouping the firms by sector.23 
 
 
 
6.1. Multicollinearity and Endogeneity Tests 
In order to deal with potential problems of multicollinearity and endogeneity derived 
from the use of both the VIX and CDS bid-ask variables, we run a series of panel 
regressions based on different variations of the baseline regression (1) whose results are 
reported in Table 4. First, we run an identical panel regression but omitting the VIX 
Index, the CDS bid-ask spread and both. The results, not presented to save space, are 
qualitatively very similar to those in Column (1) of Table 4 confirming the significance 
of the other explanatory variables and suggesting that endogeneity and collinearity are 
not a serious issue in our case. As expected, the explanatory power of the panel 
regressions is lower given that we are omitting two powerful explanatory variables: the 
VIX Index and the CDS bid-ask spread. 
                                                 
22 These alternative sampling periods are used to test whether the results may contain some bias due to the 
lack of observations in some data sources or due to the effect of the different rules for dealing with the 
collateral in the CDS contracts. We limit the sample up to December 2009 and June 2009 because the 
data obtained from Fenics and Markit are available up to such periods, respectively. We limit the sample 
up to December 2007 to take into account potential differences in terms of the standard underlying 
collateral which is used for the different data sources. 
23 All the results of this section are available upon request. 
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As an additional test for potential endogeneity between the standard deviation between 
the different data sources and the VIX and CDS bid-ask spread variables, we run a 
regression in which we use a one period (day) lag in both variables. This is a standard 
procedure to deal with potential endogeneity and we find similar results to the ones 
reported in Column (1) of Table 4. 
 
Finally, to test whether the results are biased by collinearity reasons due to the high 
correlation between the bid-ask spread and the VIX we run regression (1) but instead of 
the VIX Index using as explanatory variable the residual of the regression of the VIX 
Index onto the bid-ask spread. The residual proxies the VIX net of the illiquidity effect 
in the CDS market. We also run the regression but instead of the CDS bid-ask spread 
using as explanatory variable the residual of the regression of the CDS bid-ask spread 
onto the VIX Index.  The residual proxies the illiquidity in the CDS market net of the 
global risk effect. These results are reported in Columns (2) and (3) of Table 7 and they 
are almost identical to those in Table 4, which are also reported in Column (1) of Table 
7 for comparison. In order to estimate the coefficients presented in Columns (2) and (3) 
of Table 7 we use the bootstrap methodology to correct any potential bias in the 
standard errors due to the use of generated regressors. The results suggest that 
collinearity between the two previous variables is not a serious issue in our case.  
 
6.2. Adding a new data source 
Our previous analysis is based on five different data sources (GFI, Fenics, CMA, Markit 
and Reuters EOD). We did not employ the data from J.P. Morgan because data for US 
firms was not available. However, for the sake of robustness we repeat the previous 
analysis for the sub sample of European firms adding a new data source: JP Morgan. 
These data was employed by Mayordomo et al. (2009) in the analysis of arbitrage 
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opportunities in the credit derivatives markets. This new analysis is developed attending 
to the sample length of JP Morgan, that is, we use observations from January 1, 2005 to 
August 13, 2009 for the different data sources. 
 
First we run regression (1) but including the data for JP Morgan and find similar results 
to those in Column (2) of Table 4 for the European firms. If we also include variable for 
the number of contributors, its effect on the dependent variable is also positive. The 
lower the number of contributors, the lower is the discrepancy among the different data 
sources. We also find that collinearity and endogeneity are not a serious issue in our 
case. 
 
Finally, we repeat the price discovery analysis for the six data sources and find that the 
CMA database leads the price discovery process with respect all other databases, 
including JP Morgan.  The second more efficient data source is Markit which reflects 
credit risk more efficiently than JP Morgan, Fenics and Reuters EOD. The latter are all 
equally efficient. 
 
 
6.3. Using other econometric methodologies 
 
As a robustness test we repeat the previous analysis using alternative econometric 
techniques: pooled OLS regressions and Prais-Winsten regressions after filling the 
missing observations. We compare the results against the ones in Table 4 and show the 
robustness test results in Table 8. 
 
To test whether the assumption of firm fixed effects affect significantly the results, we 
pool all the data and run a pooled OLS regression. As can be seen in Column (2) of 
Table 8 the effects of all the potential determinants of the CDS quotes’ divergence are 
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similar to those presented in Table 4 and repeated in Column (1) of Table 8 for 
comparison, with the exception of the coefficient of the interaction term which now 
turns positive.24 Therefore, the assumption of firm fixed effects does not have a major 
effect on the results. 
 
Our data form an unbalanced panel and so, we also run a Prais-Winsten regression with 
correlated panels, corrected standard errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, 
contemporaneous correlation across panels and serial autocorrelation within panels. The 
correlation within panels is treated as a first-order autocorrelation AR(1) and the 
coefficient of this process common to all the panels.25,26 The results are reported in 
Column (3) of Table 8. The only difference with respect to the baseline results (Column 
(1) of Table 8) is that the interaction variable is not significant. 
 
6.4. Testing the robustness of the results to data transformations 
 
The dependent variable that we employ in the previous analysis is defined in logs in 
order to limit the effect of potential outliers which could appear in the quoted spreads 
due to any mistake in the contributed prices. By using the logs we also limit potential 
problems derived from a skewed distribution given that the value of the mean is almost 
four times the value of the median. We repeat regression (1) using as the dependent 
variable the ratio between the logarithm of the standard deviation among the CDS 
                                                 
24 Note that the correlation between the dependent variable and the interaction term is very low (-0.005). 
25 Each element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations 
that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance. 
26 The panel is unbalanced because we do not have information on some variables from the beginning of 
the sample. However, there are no missing values once we include the first realization of the series. There 
were some missing observations in the VIX Index across the 90 firms due to the US holidays (i. e.: third 
Monday in January and February, Last Monday in May, July 4, First Monday of September, Fourth 
Thursday in November, etc.). However, we exclude these days from our analysis. There were some 
missing values in the market capitalization variable which are related with holidays in the corresponding 
country. Nevertheless, due to the low variability in this variable, we substitute the missing data with the 
first previous day’s data available. 
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quotes and the logarithm of mean across the CDS quotes. The results are almost 
identical to the ones reported in Table 4. 
 
The data obtained from Reuters EOD are available from December 2007 whereas the 
remaining data sources have information starting from January 2004.  To avoid any 
potential bias due to the different length of the sample period covered by the different 
data sources we repeat the previous analysis without including the Reuters EOD quotes. 
We do not report these results to save space but they are almost identical to the ones 
reported in Table 4. 
 
The data obtained from Fenics and Markit are available up to June 2009 and December 
2009, respectively. To test if the results are biased by the lack of date in a given data 
source after a given date, we estimate equation (1) using data first up to June 2009, and 
after up to December 2009. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients are very similar 
to the ones reported in the first column of Table 4 and are available upon request. 
 
All the data sources but Fenics are based on the traders or dealers prices. As was 
mentioned in Section 3, Fenics data can be actual trades or mid prices calculated from 
the bid/offer quotes. If none of these are available, GFI, which is the responsible of the 
Fenics quotes, calculates the CDS spread using the Hull and White methodology to 
ensure a credit curve always exists for each reference entity. Thus, we repeat regression 
(1) using as the dependent variable the logarithm of the standard deviation among the 
CMA, Markit, Reuters EOD and JPMorgan quotes (excluding Fenics) on the 
corresponding explanatory variables.27  Results are consistent with the ones obtained 
when we include Fenics in our analysis. 
                                                 
27 We restrict our analysis to the European subsample in which we have information on JPM given that 
the use of the whole sample imply that the standard deviations across quotes calculated in the period 
before the crisis is obtained with just two contributors (CMA and Markit). 
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Since the beginning of the financial crisis counterparty risk in the CDS contracts has 
been partially mitigated through the use of collateralization. Actually, full 
collateralization of CDS liabilities has become the market standard. The ISDA Margin 
Survey 2009 reports that 74 percent of CDS contracts executed during 2008 were 
subject to collateral agreements. In order to limit any potential difference in the use of 
this collateral by the CDS data source we repeat the same analysis using a sub sample 
which spans up to December 2007 given that the use of the collateral was more limited 
before 2008. The results do not materially differ from the ones reported in the first 
column of Table 4. The only significant difference is that the coefficient of interaction 
of the number of days without a trade one day ago and the trade dummy, although with 
a positive sign is not significant now (p-value = 0.23). 
 
 
One problem of using composite and consensus prices is that we do not know the 
contributors who “contribute” to form these prices or how these prices are obtained. We 
only observe the final price which is obtained by averaging different dealers quoted and 
traded prices. However, for a sample of European firms we observe JPM quoted and 
traded prices and Fenics constructed, quoted and traded (by means of GFI) prices 
although in any of the two cases we cannot distinguish between traded and 
quoted/constructed spreads. Both JPM and Fenics CDS spreads are obtained from single 
sources and not by aggregating data.  As an additional robustness analysis, we test if the 
previous results are maintained when we compare prices obtained from two single (not 
composite) sources: the most active inter-dealer broker (GFI/Fenics) and the most active 
broker (JP Morgan). We focus our analysis on the results reported in Table 4 and 
regress the difference between the 5-year JPM and Fenics CDS spreads both in absolute 
and relative terms on the same explanatory variables that are employed in equation (1). 
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The difference between JPM and Fenics CDS spread in relative terms is obtained as the 
absolute difference between both data sources divided by the mean between JPM and 
Fenics spreads. Since there is a high correlation between the CDS bid-ask spread and 
the VIX Index (0.714) for the cases in which we have observations on both JPM and 
Fenics we include only one of these variable in the regression. Results are shown in 
Table 9. Even when we compare data sources which are formed individually without 
attending to a conglomerate of traders, the differences persist and can be explained by 
the same variables as the baseline case  in Table 4, independently of whether the 
difference between the two quotes are reported in absolute (Columns (1) and (2)) or 
relative terms (Columns (3) and (4)). 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
We study the consistency of the six most widely used CDS data bases: GFI, Fenics, 
Reuters EOD, CMA, Markit and JP Morgan, for the period from 2004 to 2010 using the 
most liquid single name 5-year CDS of the components of the leading market indexes, 
iTraxx (European firms) and CDX (US firms). We find that there are significant 
differences among them in several dimensions.  
 
Our main empirical findings are: 
 
1) When timely information on traded prices is available, the different price 
sources largely agree among them in aggregate terms. However as the 
information on transaction prices become scarcer, prices from different sources 
tend to diverge from the common trend.  The most extreme disagreements are in 
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the case of American reference entities during the crisis, where very few 
transaction prices are available in the GFI database. 
 
2) Deviations (in absolute value) from the common trend among the different CDS 
quoted spreads are not purely random but related to idiosyncratic factors like 
firm size and also to liquidity, global risk and trading factors. Prices tend to 
diverge more from the common trend in the case of for smaller firms. Increases 
in market illiquidity, idiosyncratic stock market volatility and global volatility 
increase the divergence from the common trend among prices coming from 
different data bases. 
  
3) CMA quoted CDS spreads led the credit risk price discovery process with 
respect to the quotes provided by the other databases. 
 
Extensive robustness tests support these results.  Since our analysis is based on the most 
liquid CDS prices, we would expect that the differences we find for these prices in the 
different databases would be even larger for less liquid CDSs not included in our study. 
 
 
Our analysis has important implications for research studies and industry participants.  
First, for US names with low trade frequency, no reliable information exists because 
there are almost no recorded trade prices in the GFI platform. Second, in studies of price 
discovery of the CDS market with respect other markets and given that there is a data 
source (CMA) leading the others, empirical results may change depending on the 
database employed. Third, the smaller the firm, the higher volatility of the deviations 
from the common trend of the quoted prices provided by the different CDS data sources 
and therefore the less reliable and comparable research results might be. Fourth, in 
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times of high illiquidity or increased stock market volatility CDS prices from different 
databases will tend to substantially diverge from the common trend making it more 
difficult for agents to disentangle the CDS fair value from the different prices they 
receive from the databases and for researcher using the data to decide what database 
gives the market prices’ most reliable account.   
 
Looking forward, the analysis of how the discrepancy among the different CDS 
contributors may affect the relation between the CDS and corporate Bond spreads is a 
topic worth studying. Also the consequences of using different CDS sources on testing 
the degree of informational efficiency of the different markets where credit risk is 
traded is also an interesting avenue for future research.  
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Table 1: Firm Names by Sector and CDS Index (iTraxx and CDX) 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the single name 5-year CDS. Panel A shows the names classified by 
index and sector. We use European and American firms included in the iTraxx and the CDX indexes, respectively, 
over the whole sample period. Panels B, C, D, E, and F, provide the CDS descriptive statistics for the European 
single name CDSs. The information is divided before and during the crisis. Each of the five previous panels 
corresponds to different data sources. Panel B reports the CDS traded spreads information for GFI (Number of Trades 
or Quotes, Trades per day, Mean, Std Dev., Median, Skewness, and Kurtosis of the CDS spreads as well as the 
coefficient of the AR(1) based on the CDS spreads) while Panels C, D, E, and F reports the information for CMA, 
Markit, Fenics, and Reuters EOD, respectively. Panels G, H, I, J, and K, provide the CDS descriptive statistics for the 
American single name CDSs. The information is divided before and during the crisis. Panel G reports the information 
obtained from GFI while Panels H, I, J, and K provide the information obtained from CMA, Markit, Fenics, and 
Reuters EOD, respectively. As the actual sample size of the different data sources differ (because of missing values 
and slightly different periods covered), we report the summary statistics for the cases in which we have common 
observations (trades and quotes) in all the data sources in Panel L. Finally, Panels M and N report the unit root tests 
for all the European and American single name CDSs. In the last two panels, I(1) is used to indicate that the series 
have a unit root and are integrated of order one and I(0) to indicate that the series are stationary. 
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Panel A
iTraxx Firm Name Ticker Sector CDX Firm Name Ticker Sector
AKZO Nobel NV AKZO Auto/Indust. Alcoa Inc. AA Auto/Indust.
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft BAYG Auto/Indust. Carnival Corporation CCL Auto/Indust.
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG BMWG Auto/Indust. CSX Corporation CSX Auto/Indust.
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain SGOB Auto/Indust. The Dow Chemical Company DOW Auto/Indust.
EADS NV AERM Auto/Indust. Eastman Chemical Company EMN Auto/Indust.
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft SIEG Auto/Indust. Honeywell International Inc HON Auto/Indust.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft VOWG Auto/Indust. Union Pacific Corporation UNP Auto/Indust.
Aktiebolaget Volvo VOLV Auto/Indust.
Accor ACCP Consumers Altria Group, Inc. MO Consumers
British American Tobacco PLC BATS Consumers AutoZone, Inc. AZO Consumers
Carrefour CARR Consumers Baxter International Inc. BAX Consumers
Marks and Spencer PLC MKSA Consumers Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY Consumers
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton LVMH Consumers Campbell Soup Company CPB Consumers
Metro AG METB Consumers Cardinal Health, Inc. CAH Consumers
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV PHG Consumers Loews Corporation LTR Consumers
PPR PRTP Consumers Safeway Inc. SWY Consumers
Sodexho Alliance SODE Consumers Southwest Airlines Co. LUV Consumers
Unilever NV UN Consumers The Walt Disney Company DIS Consumers
Whirlpool Corporation WHR Consumers
Edison SPA EDN Energy Anadarko Petroleum Corporation APC Energy
Electricite de France EDF Energy Arrow Electronics, Inc. ARW Energy
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg EBKG Energy ConocoPhillips COP Energy
Enel SPA ENEI Energy Constellation Energy Group, Inc. CEG Energy
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA EDP Energy Devon Energy Corporation DVN Energy
E.ON AG EONG Energy Dominion Resources, Inc. D Energy
Fortum Oyj FUMC Energy Progress Energy, Inc. PGN Energy
Iberdrola SA IBE Energy Sempra Energy SRE Energy
Repsol YPF SA REP Energy Transocean Inc. RIG Energy
RWE Aktiengesellschaft RWEG Energy Valero Energy Corporation VLO Energy
GDF Suez GDF Energy
Veolia Environnement VIE Energy
Aegon NV AEGN Financials Ace Limited ACE Financials
AXA AXAF Financials American Express Company AXP Financials
Barclays Bank PLC BCSB Financials American International Group, Inc. AIG Financials
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft CBKG Financials Boeing Capital Corporation BA Financials
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft DB Financials Cigna Corporation CI Financials
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG HNRG Financials General Electric Capital Corporation GE Financials
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa BMPS Financials Marsh & McLennan, Inc. MMC Financials
Muenchener Rueckversicherung MUVG Financials Simon Property Group, L.P. SPG Financials
Swiss Reinsurance Company RUKN Financials Wells Fargo & Company WFC Financials
XL Capital Ltd. XL Financials
Bertelsmann AG BTGG TMT AT&T Inc. T TMT
Deutsche Telekom AG DTA TMT CenturyTel, Inc. CTL TMT
France Telecom FTE TMT Comcast Cable Communications, LLC CMCC TMT
Hellenic Telecommunications OTE TMT Omnicom Group Inc. OMC TMT
Koninklijke KPN NV KPN TMT Time Warner Inc. TWX TMT
Telecom Italia SPA TLIT TMT
Telefonica SA TEF TMT
Vodafone Group PLC VOD TMT  
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Panel B: GFI
Trades Trad/Days Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Trades Trad/Days Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Accor 318 0.351 68 19 67 0.34 -0.23 0.97 99 0.149 121 59 112 0.51 -0.73 0.96
Aegon NV 348 0.385 27 5 28 -0.38 2.43 0.95 28 0.042 137 88 130 1.69 4.25 0.56
AKZO Nobel NV 318 0.351 34 8 33 0.29 -0.96 0.97 59 0.089 56 19 58 0.14 -0.31 0.85
AXA 322 0.356 29 6 29 -0.09 -0.12 0.98 20 0.030 97 37 96 0.15 -0.11 0.67
Barclays Bank PLC 270 0.298 11 3 11 4.39 29.45 0.97 104 0.157 98 46 94 0.57 -0.14 0.93
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 320 0.354 36 9 37 0.01 -1.37 0.97 33 0.050 52 18 49 0.81 0.80 0.78
Bertelsmann AG 213 0.235 42 10 45 -0.75 -0.63 0.96 111 0.167 137 75 135 0.62 -0.18 0.95
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 279 0.308 26 7 26 -0.30 -0.91 0.98 110 0.166 107 85 90 2.37 6.80 0.94
British American Tobacco PLC 352 0.389 56 17 56 0.22 0.44 0.99 72 0.108 77 31 74 0.53 -0.33 0.90
Carrefour 413 0.456 24 5 22 0.30 0.13 0.96 143 0.215 57 24 55 0.53 0.08 0.94
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 340 0.376 23 8 20 2.54 11.71 0.90 75 0.113 83 28 75 0.56 -0.73 0.81
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 352 0.389 17 5 16 2.95 13.79 0.97 99 0.149 85 36 85 0.23 -1.03 0.91
Deutsche Telekom AG 407 0.450 38 7 39 0.09 2.11 0.90 291 0.438 87 37 84 2.13 15.47 0.79
EADS NV 98 0.108 23 4 23 1.34 2.87 0.80 110 0.166 93 62 82 2.39 6.29 0.89
Edison SPA 211 0.233 42 19 35 1.29 1.35 0.97 32 0.048 76 28 74 0.47 -0.44 0.70
Electricite de France 304 0.336 22 6 23 -0.37 -0.82 0.96 91 0.137 66 31 56 1.11 0.67 0.94
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg 241 0.266 29 10 28 0.14 -1.18 1.00 34 0.051 56 13 55 0.54 1.60 0.33
Enel SPA 317 0.350 25 7 27 -0.07 0.27 1.00 114 0.172 133 108 100 2.78 7.59 0.93
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 292 0.323 28 7 26 -0.25 -0.38 0.98 67 0.101 96 30 98 -0.41 -0.34 0.81
E.ON AG 334 0.369 21 5 20 0.72 0.37 0.96 72 0.108 66 23 62 0.12 -0.31 0.86
Fortum Oyj 235 0.260 32 8 33 -0.67 0.79 0.95 25 0.038 67 25 68 1.18 1.44 0.54
France Telecom 650 0.718 43 12 42 0.21 -0.59 0.99 239 0.360 73 29 79 0.13 -1.00 0.98
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 276 0.305 29 7 28 0.38 1.48 0.96 23 0.035 61 15 60 1.40 3.27 0.23
Hellenic Telecommunications 453 0.501 45 9 44 -0.18 -0.64 0.96 193 0.291 90 33 90 0.35 -0.53 0.95
Iberdrola SA 300 0.331 25 5 23 0.14 -1.39 0.96 65 0.098 97 32 91 1.11 1.18 0.80
Koninklijke KPN NV 567 0.627 51 15 48 1.03 0.45 0.99 219 0.330 77 31 74 0.67 -0.40 0.97
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 319 0.352 36 9 35 0.01 -0.15 0.98 100 0.151 77 39 64 1.41 1.88 0.93
Marks and Spencer PLC 55 0.061 41 13 38 1.92 3.10 0.90 211 0.318 187 107 170 0.65 -0.19 0.97
Metro AG 420 0.464 47 11 45 0.31 -0.40 0.98 130 0.196 143 94 114 0.94 -0.04 0.95
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 324 0.358 20 3 19 -0.06 1.83 0.92 42 0.063 78 26 75 0.19 -0.52 0.72
Muenchener Rueckversicherung 325 0.359 25 3 26 -1.57 7.22 0.89 28 0.042 50 21 48 1.11 1.81 0.64
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 129 0.143 33 9 33 -0.06 -1.05 0.96 108 0.163 67 27 63 0.61 0.46 0.90
PPR 474 0.524 85 38 72 0.78 -0.58 0.99 137 0.206 201 126 191 2.03 5.21 0.96
Repsol YPF SA 289 0.319 42 11 39 0.18 -1.43 0.99 43 0.065 147 99 106 1.75 2.55 0.80
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 335 0.370 23 6 22 0.34 0.07 0.97 54 0.081 55 20 50 0.45 -0.17 0.85
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 211 0.233 34 7 36 0.71 1.23 0.94 49 0.074 144 54 125 0.84 0.61 0.80
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 134 0.148 22 6 22 0.06 -1.31 0.96 113 0.170 83 42 73 0.63 -0.34 0.96
Sodexho Alliance . . . . . . . . 84 0.127 65 22 61 0.57 -0.37 0.87
GDF Suez . . . . . . . . 31 0.047 59 15 57 2.61 7.20 0.71
Swiss Reinsurance Company 317 0.350 23 4 23 1.95 12.94 0.83 25 0.038 114 56 114 1.15 2.39 0.67
Telecom Italia SPA 728 0.804 57 11 55 0.40 0.16 0.96 336 0.506 153 83 141 1.09 1.13 0.98
Telefonica SA 614 0.678 39 9 39 0.24 -0.64 0.97 263 0.396 95 42 88 0.72 0.22 0.97
Unilever NV 215 0.238 17 3 16 0.79 -0.37 0.93 92 0.139 41 16 38 0.55 -0.70 0.91
Veolia Environnement 344 0.380 42 36 34 5.96 37.25 0.86 75 0.113 94 31 90 0.52 -0.59 0.85
Vodafone Group PLC 471 0.520 30 7 27 0.89 0.07 0.97 229 0.345 90 42 80 0.72 -0.26 0.98
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 415 0.459 55 16 59 -0.58 -0.39 0.99 116 0.175 118 70 103 1.34 2.17 0.93
Aktiebolaget Volvo 262 0.290 37 6 38 -0.85 0.06 0.94 77 0.116 139 108 107 2.05 3.93 0.95
Average 331 0.366 35 10 33 0.55 2.58 0.95 104 0.156 95 47 87 0.95 1.47 0.83
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
Panel C: CMA
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Accor 905 58 20 56 0.74 0.14 0.99 664 127 57 125 0.31 -0.75 0.99
Aegon NV 905 21 8 23 0.16 0.47 0.99 664 191 124 144 1.10 0.52 0.99
AKZO Nobel NV 905 30 7 28 1.03 0.47 0.99 664 74 33 68 0.87 0.27 0.99
AXA 905 22 8 23 -0.09 -0.91 0.98 664 110 55 97 0.74 -0.36 0.99
Barclays Bank PLC 905 10 3 9 3.62 23.15 0.99 664 108 51 94 0.66 -0.10 0.99
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 905 30 8 28 0.61 -0.32 0.99 664 62 25 53 1.28 1.24 0.99
Bertelsmann AG 905 36 9 35 -0.06 -0.30 0.99 664 150 88 139 0.50 -0.79 1.00
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 905 21 8 21 0.27 -0.46 1.00 664 144 111 103 1.32 0.83 0.99
British American Tobacco PLC 905 45 18 43 0.67 -0.08 1.00 664 74 30 66 1.19 1.35 0.99
Carrefour 905 21 6 21 0.38 -0.11 0.98 664 59 21 58 0.60 0.97 0.99
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 905 18 8 17 1.64 6.19 0.98 664 81 26 74 0.84 0.32 0.97
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 905 15 4 15 2.85 18.36 0.97 664 90 32 86 0.30 -0.32 0.98
Deutsche Telekom AG 905 41 10 40 0.57 0.16 0.99 664 90 32 90 0.41 -0.07 0.99
EADS NV 902 25 6 24 0.48 -0.73 0.99 664 126 104 90 2.07 4.23 1.00
Edison SPA 905 32 17 29 1.09 0.35 1.00 664 75 35 76 0.92 0.60 0.99
Electricite de France 905 17 7 17 0.33 -0.67 0.99 664 59 31 49 1.23 1.09 0.99
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg 905 22 9 21 0.79 -0.13 0.99 664 49 15 52 0.18 0.33 0.98
Enel SPA 905 20 6 20 0.93 1.05 0.99 664 152 138 96 1.98 3.00 1.00
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 905 23 8 22 0.41 -0.37 0.99 664 81 33 78 0.47 -0.66 0.99
E.ON AG 905 19 5 18 0.50 0.68 0.99 664 64 23 59 0.72 0.92 0.99
Fortum Oyj 905 25 10 26 0.17 -0.78 1.00 664 60 25 50 1.55 2.41 0.99
France Telecom 905 41 13 41 0.21 -0.59 0.99 664 69 27 60 0.39 -1.08 0.99
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 905 23 10 23 0.63 0.66 0.99 664 64 24 62 0.73 0.56 0.98
Hellenic Telecommunications 905 45 9 45 -0.32 -0.69 0.98 664 91 33 85 0.66 -0.12 0.99
Iberdrola SA 905 22 5 22 0.33 -0.58 0.98 664 96 44 88 1.14 1.26 0.99
Koninklijke KPN NV 905 53 16 50 0.88 0.02 0.99 664 77 28 70 0.82 0.18 0.99
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 905 32 10 31 0.45 -0.23 0.99 664 75 40 62 1.54 1.80 0.99
Marks and Spencer PLC 905 72 49 49 1.64 3.29 0.99 664 192 112 164 0.88 0.18 0.99
Metro AG 905 42 11 42 0.54 -0.24 0.99 664 140 90 111 1.09 0.43 0.99
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 905 16 6 16 0.33 0.50 0.99 664 80 28 77 0.61 0.21 0.98
Muenchener Rueckversicherung 905 19 8 21 -0.12 -0.84 0.99 664 51 19 47 1.33 2.51 0.98
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 905 31 9 32 0.03 -0.73 0.99 664 67 31 54 1.05 0.53 0.99
PPR 905 75 37 61 1.13 0.09 1.00 664 259 166 214 1.15 0.26 1.00
Repsol YPF SA 905 36 10 35 0.86 0.65 1.00 664 137 99 102 1.90 3.01 1.00
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 905 19 6 19 0.76 0.73 0.99 664 52 18 47 0.48 -0.06 0.98
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 905 32 6 31 0.89 1.97 0.98 664 181 108 149 1.17 0.79 1.00
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 905 18 5 17 0.66 -0.48 0.99 664 83 45 69 1.18 1.29 0.99
Sodexho Alliance 905 43 19 39 0.48 -1.13 1.00 664 59 21 53 0.76 -0.17 0.99
GDF Suez 905 13 4 13 0.18 0.08 0.97 664 53 23 51 1.64 3.29 0.99
Swiss Reinsurance Company 905 19 6 20 -0.20 0.54 0.99 664 212 190 126 1.29 0.45 1.00
Telecom Italia SPA 905 56 11 55 0.35 0.38 0.98 664 180 105 148 1.03 0.24 1.00
Telefonica SA 905 39 9 38 0.34 -0.52 0.99 664 100 39 94 0.88 0.93 0.99
Unilever NV 905 19 5 17 1.00 0.47 0.98 664 39 15 35 0.98 0.59 0.99
Veolia Environnement 905 33 9 32 0.95 0.22 0.99 664 95 38 85 0.63 -0.41 0.99
Vodafone Group PLC 905 30 6 29 0.63 -0.16 0.99 664 95 43 85 1.01 0.33 0.99
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 905 45 19 45 0.05 -1.33 1.00 664 139 78 118 0.77 -0.13 0.99
Aktiebolaget Volvo 905 32 7 31 0.38 -0.80 0.98 664 220 161 178 0.75 -0.58 1.00
Average 905 31 10 29 0.64 1.01 0.99 664 105 58 89 0.96 0.67 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel D: Markit
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Accor 905 58 20 56 0.76 0.19 1.00 587 123 59 116 0.47 -0.74 1.00
Aegon NV 905 21 7 23 0.02 -0.18 1.00 587 198 129 158 0.88 -0.05 0.99
AKZO Nobel NV 905 30 7 27 1.06 0.51 0.99 587 76 35 70 0.73 -0.18 0.99
AXA 412 15 6 13 1.90 6.30 0.99 587 113 58 101 0.54 -0.72 0.99
Barclays Bank PLC 905 10 3 9 3.30 20.23 1.01 587 110 53 98 0.50 -0.49 0.99
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 905 30 8 28 0.64 -0.32 0.99 587 64 26 57 1.09 0.70 0.99
Bertelsmann AG 905 36 9 34 -0.05 -0.27 0.99 587 150 94 121 0.46 -1.06 1.00
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 905 21 8 21 0.28 -0.46 1.00 587 151 116 110 1.12 0.29 1.00
British American Tobacco PLC 905 45 18 44 0.66 -0.12 1.00 587 76 31 70 0.98 0.81 0.99
Carrefour 905 22 6 21 0.39 -0.02 0.99 587 59 22 57 0.62 0.57 0.99
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 905 18 8 16 1.62 5.81 0.99 587 82 27 74 0.68 -0.12 0.98
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 905 15 4 15 2.87 17.78 0.98 587 90 33 88 0.19 -0.69 0.98
Deutsche Telekom AG 905 41 10 39 0.57 0.10 0.99 587 93 33 95 0.20 -0.21 0.99
EADS NV 905 26 7 24 0.76 -0.25 0.99 587 131 109 91 1.85 3.20 1.00
Edison SPA 905 32 17 28 1.10 0.34 1.00 587 74 37 69 0.94 0.21 0.99
Electricite de France 683 15 5 15 0.26 -0.51 1.00 587 60 32 49 1.10 0.60 0.99
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg 561 17 5 17 0.26 -0.67 0.99 587 48 15 51 0.33 0.15 0.99
Enel SPA 905 20 6 19 0.96 1.19 1.00 587 161 143 99 1.77 2.13 1.00
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 704 20 6 21 -0.17 -1.07 1.00 587 78 33 76 0.57 -0.54 0.99
E.ON AG 905 19 5 18 0.51 0.67 0.99 587 65 24 61 0.55 0.45 0.99
Fortum Oyj 905 25 10 26 0.17 -0.78 1.00 587 61 26 51 1.37 1.78 0.99
France Telecom 905 41 12 40 0.22 -0.57 0.99 587 71 28 74 0.17 -1.13 0.99
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 905 23 10 23 0.51 0.22 0.99 587 64 25 61 0.67 0.14 0.98
Hellenic Telecommunications 905 45 9 45 -0.35 -0.68 0.99 587 89 34 81 0.80 -0.10 0.99
Iberdrola SA 905 22 5 22 0.28 -0.57 0.99 587 99 46 91 1.01 0.80 0.99
Koninklijke KPN NV 905 52 16 50 0.85 -0.08 1.00 587 80 29 79 0.64 -0.01 0.99
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 905 32 10 31 0.47 -0.20 1.00 587 78 42 62 1.35 1.10 0.99
Marks and Spencer PLC 905 72 49 49 1.65 3.35 0.99 587 200 116 183 0.68 -0.20 0.99
Metro AG 905 42 11 42 0.55 -0.22 0.99 587 144 93 129 0.90 -0.07 0.99
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 905 16 6 16 0.31 0.21 1.00 587 78 29 74 0.72 0.20 0.98
Muenchener Rueckversicherung 905 19 8 21 -0.18 -0.94 1.00 587 52 19 49 1.12 1.71 0.98
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 905 30 9 32 0.03 -0.74 1.00 585 70 33 57 0.84 0.09 0.99
PPR 559 52 12 49 1.32 2.29 0.98 585 275 170 226 0.96 -0.15 1.00
Repsol YPF SA 905 36 10 35 0.89 0.63 1.00 585 142 105 103 1.69 2.08 1.00
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 905 19 6 19 0.77 0.68 1.00 585 53 19 48 0.33 -0.45 0.99
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 905 32 6 31 0.87 1.90 0.99 585 190 111 163 0.91 0.16 1.00
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 905 18 5 17 0.63 -0.57 1.00 585 86 47 71 0.99 0.74 0.99
Sodexho Alliance . . . . . . . 472 64 22 58 0.60 -0.75 0.99
GDF Suez . . . . . . . 332 64 24 55 1.56 1.28 0.99
Swiss Reinsurance Company . . . . . . . 411 293 201 212 0.70 -0.86 1.00
Telecom Italia SPA 905 56 11 54 0.34 0.27 0.98 587 187 110 153 0.85 -0.15 1.00
Telefonica SA 905 39 9 38 0.28 -0.70 0.99 585 102 41 98 0.70 0.45 0.99
Unilever NV 905 19 5 18 0.94 0.29 0.99 585 40 16 36 0.85 0.13 0.99
Veolia Environnement 905 33 9 31 1.00 0.34 1.00 587 98 40 96 0.43 -0.72 0.99
Vodafone Group PLC 905 30 6 29 0.63 -0.26 0.99 587 98 45 94 0.82 -0.05 0.99
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 905 45 19 45 0.04 -1.34 1.00 587 145 80 126 0.56 -0.44 0.99
Aktiebolaget Volvo 905 32 8 31 0.37 -0.86 0.99 585 225 170 168 0.61 -0.93 1.00
Average 869 30 10 29 0.69 1.16 0.99 575 110 60 94 0.82 0.19 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel E: Fenics
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Accor 902 58 20 56 0.79 0.32 0.99 447 109 57 92 0.99 0.44 0.99
Aegon NV 904 21 8 23 0.29 1.95 0.98 446 206 151 147 0.85 0.14 0.99
AKZO Nobel NV 904 30 7 27 1.09 0.75 0.98 446 76 39 64 0.53 -0.87 0.99
AXA 904 22 8 23 -0.20 -1.06 0.99 446 123 65 109 0.39 -0.72 0.99
Barclays Bank PLC 904 10 3 9 3.62 24.29 0.98 446 114 57 116 0.25 -1.04 0.98
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 900 30 8 28 0.65 -0.31 0.99 250 52 18 50 0.75 0.78 0.98
Bertelsmann AG 904 36 9 35 0.02 -0.14 0.99 446 130 98 89 1.05 -0.21 1.00
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 904 21 9 21 1.34 8.57 0.95 446 160 135 102 0.97 -0.28 0.99
British American Tobacco PLC 902 46 18 44 0.63 -0.25 0.99 447 79 35 75 0.70 -0.03 0.99
Carrefour 904 22 6 21 0.40 0.30 0.97 446 58 25 58 0.72 0.42 0.98
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 903 18 8 17 1.71 6.66 0.97 446 81 28 75 0.71 -0.14 0.97
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 724 14 4 14 3.79 23.99 0.96 659 89 31 87 0.18 -0.54 0.97
Deutsche Telekom AG 903 41 10 39 0.54 0.05 0.98 446 97 36 99 -0.03 -0.53 0.98
EADS NV 895 26 7 24 0.77 -0.23 0.98 454 142 120 94 1.46 1.58 0.99
Edison SPA 896 33 17 28 1.12 0.39 0.99 456 71 40 54 1.01 -0.26 0.99
Electricite de France 904 18 7 17 0.36 -0.61 0.99 446 63 36 52 0.84 -0.14 0.99
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg 902 22 10 21 0.83 -0.05 0.99 447 47 17 44 0.63 -0.03 0.98
Enel SPA 896 20 6 20 1.00 1.22 1.00 453 177 156 99 1.34 0.65 0.99
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 895 23 8 22 0.31 -0.53 0.99 454 77 37 61 0.72 -0.73 0.98
E.ON AG 902 19 5 19 0.49 0.74 0.98 447 66 27 64 0.35 -0.23 0.98
Fortum Oyj 903 25 10 26 0.14 -0.76 1.00 446 65 29 57 1.09 0.87 0.98
France Telecom 896 41 13 40 0.23 -0.57 0.98 453 79 27 85 -0.34 -0.77 0.98
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 903 24 11 23 2.05 13.87 0.95 446 69 25 68 0.19 -0.22 0.98
Hellenic Telecommunications 904 45 9 45 -0.29 -0.65 0.98 449 92 37 87 0.50 -0.82 0.99
Iberdrola SA 902 23 5 22 0.30 -0.57 0.99 447 100 52 86 0.81 -0.06 0.99
Koninklijke KPN NV 904 53 16 50 0.91 0.15 0.99 446 87 29 86 0.29 0.09 0.98
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 904 32 9 32 0.27 -0.26 0.99 450 83 47 63 0.97 -0.05 0.99
Marks and Spencer PLC 896 72 49 48 1.71 3.69 0.98 474 217 125 208 0.37 -0.58 0.99
Metro AG 904 42 11 42 0.53 -0.24 0.99 450 138 104 87 1.01 -0.26 0.99
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 904 16 6 17 0.25 0.17 0.99 450 81 33 78 0.54 -0.43 0.98
Muenchener Rueckversicherung 904 19 8 21 0.00 0.14 0.96 450 56 19 55 0.59 0.85 0.97
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 896 31 9 32 0.01 -0.87 0.99 453 72 35 60 0.58 -0.60 0.99
PPR 903 75 37 61 1.13 0.13 1.00 451 291 190 240 0.70 -0.75 0.99
Repsol YPF SA 903 36 10 35 0.83 0.51 0.98 451 153 122 86 1.46 1.23 0.99
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 904 19 6 19 0.81 0.94 0.99 450 55 21 53 0.09 -0.82 0.98
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 903 32 6 30 0.90 1.72 0.98 451 200 118 183 0.42 -1.01 0.99
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 902 18 6 17 0.73 -0.30 0.99 451 89 53 75 0.73 -0.11 0.99
Sodexho Alliance 397 27 6 26 0.79 0.26 0.98 659 60 21 53 0.75 -0.28 0.98
GDF Suez 397 12 4 12 0.01 -0.62 0.99 659 53 24 51 1.61 2.91 0.99
Swiss Reinsurance Company 902 19 6 20 -0.20 0.64 0.98 451 252 220 129 0.65 -1.27 0.99
Telecom Italia SPA 896 56 11 54 0.37 0.44 0.97 458 197 122 165 0.59 -0.79 0.99
Telefonica SA 903 39 9 38 0.34 -0.54 0.98 449 106 45 102 0.49 -0.10 0.98
Unilever NV 798 18 4 17 1.50 3.13 0.96 603 40 15 36 0.82 0.10 0.98
Veolia Environnement 902 33 9 31 1.01 0.39 0.99 450 96 45 80 0.61 -0.82 0.99
Vodafone Group PLC 903 30 6 29 0.60 -0.30 0.98 448 106 49 101 0.50 -0.52 0.99
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 904 45 19 45 0.03 -1.35 1.00 447 147 88 124 0.49 -0.71 0.99
Aktiebolaget Volvo 902 30 8 28 0.63 -0.69 0.99 449 204 183 103 0.88 -0.78 1.00
Average 874 31 10 29 0.75 1.80 0.98 462 111 66 90 0.68 -0.16 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel F: Reuters EOD
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Accor 539 143 50 137 0.38 -0.74 0.99
Aegon NV 539 217 115 170 1.17 0.29 0.99
AKZO Nobel NV 540 83 30 73 1.07 0.22 0.99
AXA 538 123 51 106 0.76 -0.49 0.99
Barclays Bank PLC 538 122 45 113 0.70 -0.40 0.98
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 513 67 25 57 1.31 0.81 0.99
Bertelsmann AG 536 173 80 160 0.38 -0.89 0.99
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG 537 167 110 115 1.25 0.47 0.99
British American Tobacco PLC 538 81 27 73 1.52 2.07 0.99
Carrefour 535 65 18 62 1.12 2.15 0.98
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft 535 87 23 80 0.92 0.08 0.97
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 533 99 25 95 0.53 -0.36 0.97
Deutsche Telekom AG 530 99 27 97 0.76 0.18 0.99
EADS NV 538 141 100 95 1.85 3.12 1.00
Edison SPA 527 82 34 82 0.65 0.30 0.99
Electricite de France 529 66 29 57 1.35 1.17 0.99
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg 514 53 12 54 0.59 1.34 0.98
Enel SPA 529 173 142 102 1.74 1.97 1.00
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA 528 89 31 89 0.33 -0.61 0.99
E.ON AG 514 70 20 63 1.42 1.77 0.98
Fortum Oyj 514 65 25 54 1.68 2.67 0.99
France Telecom 514 74 26 77 0.25 -1.11 0.99
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG 524 69 22 66 0.82 0.68 0.98
Hellenic Telecommunications 512 99 30 93 0.79 -0.21 0.99
Iberdrola SA 524 107 40 95 1.36 1.34 0.99
Koninklijke KPN NV 514 80 27 79 0.81 0.52 0.99
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 517 83 40 64 1.48 1.21 0.99
Marks and Spencer PLC 514 223 102 194 0.96 0.06 0.99
Metro AG 517 162 85 141 0.99 0.09 0.99
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa 513 88 26 82 1.01 0.40 0.97
Muenchener Rueckversicherung 513 53 17 49 1.48 3.33 0.97
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV 511 74 31 57 0.97 0.08 0.99
PPR 510 300 162 240 1.03 -0.27 1.00
Repsol YPF SA 508 155 105 111 1.61 1.81 0.99
RWE Aktiengesellschaft 514 57 16 50 0.95 -0.04 0.98
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 552 202 101 167 1.18 0.51 0.99
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 514 95 42 73 1.43 1.71 0.99
Sodexho Alliance 554 63 20 58 0.77 -0.33 0.99
GDF Suez 514 57 22 52 1.72 2.86 0.99
Swiss Reinsurance Company 535 238 190 139 1.22 0.26 1.00
Telecom Italia SPA 517 208 97 164 1.10 0.00 0.99
Telefonica SA 518 109 34 101 1.25 1.24 0.99
Unilever NV 554 42 14 38 1.05 0.61 0.99
Veolia Environnement 554 104 35 98 0.66 -0.47 0.99
Vodafone Group PLC 535 105 41 96 1.04 0.27 0.99
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 514 161 72 134 0.83 -0.21 0.99
Aktiebolaget Volvo 551 253 155 203 0.58 -0.77 1.00
Average 527 118 55 99 1.04 0.61 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel G: GFI
Trades Trad/Days Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Trades Trad/Days Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Ace Limited 18 0.020 32 0 32 . . . 8 0.012 118 24 123 . . .
Alcoa Inc. 61 0.067 30 5 27 1.46 5.93 0.58 2 0.003 159 165 159 . . .
Altria Group, Inc. 258 0.285 139 49 139 -0.13 -0.82 1.00 13 0.020 69 28 65 . . .
American Express Company 190 0.210 26 5 29 0.42 1.29 0.94 61 0.092 209 148 180 1.80 3.20 0.81
American International Group, Inc. 442 0.488 24 0 24 . . . 157 0.236 59 133 24 3.95 14.82 1.03
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 59 0.065 38 7 37 1.10 -0.01 0.91 8 0.012 123 91 98 . . .
Arrow Electronics, Inc. 263 0.291 105 31 105 0.19 -1.42 1.00 11 0.017 74 24 82 . . .
AT&T Inc. 301 0.333 39 10 37 0.39 -0.71 0.99 7 0.011 66 34 77 . . .
AutoZone, Inc. 129 0.143 88 14 90 -0.73 1.01 0.86 8 0.012 95 49 85 . . .
Baxter International Inc. 48 0.053 40 10 43 -1.06 -0.12 0.96 2 0.003 26 4 26 . . .
Boeing Capital Corporation 156 0.172 35 10 39 -0.29 -1.43 0.99 5 0.008 73 43 67 . . .
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 59 0.065 36 11 39 -0.64 -0.79 0.97 3 0.005 26 5 24 . . .
Campbell Soup Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cardinal Health, Inc. 80 0.088 72 41 65 0.44 -1.26 0.95 2 0.003 49 16 49 . . .
Carnival Corporation 34 0.038 21 1 22 -0.53 -1.36 0.91 5 0.008 62 38 82 . . .
CenturyTel, Inc. 286 0.316 88 24 88 0.08 -0.96 0.96 10 0.015 101 33 96 . . .
Cigna Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC 228 0.252 62 17 67 -0.25 -1.02 0.97 11 0.017 64 18 59 . . .
ConocoPhillips 54 0.060 29 4 30 -1.63 1.09 0.80 2 0.003 94 17 94 . . .
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 102 0.113 45 11 52 -0.31 -1.71 0.86 16 0.024 132 87 94 . . .
CSX Corporation 115 0.127 54 14 50 0.35 -0.68 0.92 3 0.005 112 17 110 . . .
Devon Energy Corporation 70 0.077 39 4 40 0.29 -0.36 0.84 6 0.009 77 35 85 . . .
Dominion Resources, Inc. 122 0.135 46 11 47 -0.10 -0.79 0.91 7 0.011 60 14 57 . . .
The Dow Chemical Company 135 0.149 42 10 44 -0.11 -1.27 0.94 4 0.006 180 180 93 . . .
Eastman Chemical Company 118 0.130 61 7 61 0.36 -0.60 0.90 8 0.012 84 40 81 . . .
General Electric Capital Corporation 329 0.364 27 5 26 -0.30 -0.20 0.96 42 0.063 158 137 125 1.85 2.62 0.83
Honeywell International Inc 6 0.007 17 4 19 -1.23 -0.34 4.25 6 0.009 42 14 34 . . .
Loews Corporation 20 0.022 64 8 60 3.17 10.23 0.16 4 0.006 80 8 82 . . .
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. 21 0.023 81 13 72 0.72 -1.41 0.83 5 0.008 77 18 70 . . .
Omnicom Group Inc. 124 0.137 42 11 41 0.22 -0.53 0.87 6 0.009 126 126 66 . . .
Progress Energy, Inc. 115 0.127 53 8 53 0.50 5.77 0.80 14 0.021 50 15 44 . . .
Safeway Inc. 268 0.296 71 12 71 0.19 0.56 0.94 3 0.005 65 23 60 . . .
Sempra Energy 124 0.137 45 9 41 0.48 -0.85 0.89 8 0.012 61 27 56 . . .
Simon Property Group, L.P. 53 0.059 49 7 51 -1.27 0.66 0.96 16 0.024 243 202 183 . . .
Southwest Airlines Co. 134 0.148 55 16 47 0.39 -1.57 0.97 2 0.003 215 86 215 . . .
Time Warner Inc. 192 0.212 57 16 57 0.33 -1.25 0.97 14 0.021 99 46 110 . . .
Transocean Inc. 37 0.041 39 5 40 -0.43 4.16 0.55 5 0.008 214 119 260 . . .
Union Pacific Corporation 92 0.102 43 6 46 -0.65 -1.02 0.95 4 0.006 59 23 64 . . .
Valero Energy Corporation 79 0.087 58 14 55 1.12 0.22 0.95 3 0.005 108 91 56 . . .
The Walt Disney Company 205 0.227 47 15 46 0.04 -1.06 0.98 9 0.014 53 15 60 . . .
Wells Fargo & Company 199 0.220 22 6 26 -0.17 0.28 0.96 76 0.114 96 62 86 1.53 2.23 0.89
Whirlpool Corporation 125 0.138 59 20 64 -0.22 -1.65 0.95 6 0.009 113 76 89 . . .
XL Capital Ltd. 309 0.341 52 2 52 0.00 0.00 0.00 2 0.003 98 118 98 . . .
Average 140 0.155 50 12 51 0.06 0.15 0.95 14 0.021 99 60 89 2.28 5.72 0.89
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel H: CMA
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Ace Limited 905 40 14 41 0.14 -0.76 0.99 664 80 32 73 0.60 0.26 0.98
Alcoa Inc. 905 27 9 25 0.75 -0.42 0.99 664 282 244 207 1.20 0.53 1.00
Altria Group, Inc. 905 88 55 80 0.60 -0.66 1.00 664 85 33 86 0.09 -0.75 0.99
American Express Company 905 21 7 21 0.32 0.44 0.99 664 208 154 165 1.38 1.26 0.99
American International Group, Inc. 905 20 9 19 1.36 3.08 0.99 664 714 717 535 1.47 2.00 0.98
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 905 34 7 34 1.18 2.54 0.98 664 107 72 78 1.48 0.95 1.00
Arrow Electronics, Inc. 905 76 28 67 1.04 0.01 1.00 664 95 48 82 1.62 2.93 0.99
AT&T Inc. 905 32 11 32 0.57 2.71 0.99 664 90 43 80 0.82 3.41 0.99
AutoZone, Inc. 905 31 22 69 0.03 -0.84 0.99 664 84 37 72 0.98 0.78 0.99
Baxter International Inc. 905 27 13 25 0.69 0.11 1.00 664 30 9 27 0.50 -0.77 0.99
Boeing Capital Corporation 905 22 12 20 0.64 -0.60 1.00 664 102 75 82 0.99 0.33 0.99
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 905 22 10 20 0.86 -0.09 1.00 664 38 12 35 0.70 -0.15 0.99
Campbell Soup Company 905 22 7 23 0.01 -0.84 0.98 664 31 10 30 0.81 0.43 0.98
Cardinal Health, Inc. 905 47 30 35 2.11 4.72 0.99 664 55 17 52 0.70 0.76 0.98
Carnival Corporation 905 32 13 28 1.20 0.30 0.99 664 155 103 128 1.31 0.94 1.00
CenturyTel, Inc. 905 74 20 71 1.22 1.11 0.99 664 108 45 98 0.49 -0.77 0.99
Cigna Corporation 905 38 14 37 0.49 -0.20 0.99 664 124 76 110 1.03 0.78 0.99
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC 905 45 16 41 0.59 -0.65 1.00 664 124 58 119 0.80 1.15 0.99
ConocoPhillips 905 22 5 22 -0.32 -0.08 0.99 664 56 25 48 1.19 0.60 0.99
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 905 36 11 36 0.06 -0.86 0.99 664 196 120 163 1.05 0.68 0.98
CSX Corporation 905 40 13 37 0.59 -0.46 0.99 664 97 45 81 0.60 -0.99 0.99
Devon Energy Corporation 905 36 13 34 0.72 -0.06 0.99 664 59 24 56 0.85 0.23 0.99
Dominion Resources, Inc. 905 39 13 40 -0.01 -0.67 0.99 664 58 21 52 1.72 2.80 0.99
The Dow Chemical Company 905 31 11 28 0.72 -0.54 0.98 664 168 155 113 1.66 1.93 1.00
Eastman Chemical Company 905 51 10 50 0.42 -0.28 0.98 664 78 41 63 1.38 0.99 0.99
General Electric Capital Corporation 905 21 7 21 0.31 -0.91 1.00 664 262 205 191 1.10 0.56 0.99
Honeywell International Inc 905 20 7 18 1.23 0.63 0.99 664 52 27 45 1.38 1.59 0.99
Loews Corporation 905 31 17 27 0.81 -0.30 1.00 664 57 20 55 0.25 -0.36 0.99
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. 905 55 28 46 3.12 15.76 0.97 664 67 19 64 0.78 0.54 0.98
Omnicom Group Inc. 905 30 11 30 0.34 -0.56 0.99 664 109 94 69 1.58 1.19 1.00
Progress Energy, Inc. 905 39 17 44 -0.26 -0.78 1.00 664 54 14 53 0.18 -1.03 0.98
Safeway Inc. 905 60 16 60 0.28 -0.44 0.99 664 73 23 71 0.13 0.18 0.99
Sempra Energy 905 35 13 39 -0.10 -0.38 0.99 664 74 30 71 0.36 -0.72 0.99
Simon Property Group, L.P. 905 36 13 36 0.14 -1.10 0.99 664 248 202 162 1.54 1.30 1.00
Southwest Airlines Co. 905 44 15 42 0.59 -0.31 0.99 664 181 95 169 1.16 1.66 0.99
Time Warner Inc. 905 50 17 47 0.40 -0.85 0.99 664 101 48 88 0.54 -0.69 0.99
Transocean Inc. 905 32 7 30 0.69 -0.44 0.98 664 110 78 86 1.69 1.87 1.00
Union Pacific Corporation 905 35 9 36 0.44 0.46 0.98 664 63 24 58 1.07 1.28 0.99
Valero Energy Corporation 905 44 14 42 0.94 1.67 0.99 664 176 81 189 -0.07 -0.81 0.99
The Walt Disney Company 905 31 16 29 0.59 -0.52 1.00 664 52 22 47 1.15 1.50 0.99
Wells Fargo & Company 905 15 6 14 0.82 0.62 0.99 664 110 54 97 1.24 2.05 0.98
Whirlpool Corporation 905 50 13 48 0.41 -0.60 0.99 664 185 129 141 1.28 0.75 1.00
XL Capital Ltd. 905 41 11 43 -0.07 1.12 1.00 664 358 298 250 1.02 -0.24 0.99
Average 905 38 14 37 0.62 0.47 0.99 664 129 86 106 0.97 0.72 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel I: Markit
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Ace Limited 905 40 15 40 0.57 1.10 0.99 586 81 34 75 0.43 -0.28 0.99
Alcoa Inc. 905 27 9 25 0.89 0.01 0.99 586 291 260 190 1.04 0.01 1.00
Altria Group, Inc. 905 88 55 81 0.58 -0.71 1.00 584 82 33 83 0.22 -0.73 1.00
American Express Company 905 21 7 21 0.24 0.11 1.00 586 226 158 182 1.19 0.72 0.99
American International Group, Inc. 905 20 9 19 1.37 3.24 1.00 586 745 756 503 1.23 0.96 0.99
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 905 34 7 34 1.19 2.41 0.99 586 114 75 85 1.25 0.29 1.00
Arrow Electronics, Inc. 905 76 28 67 1.05 0.03 1.00 586 95 51 82 1.57 2.44 0.99
AT&T Inc. 431 26 8 23 0.59 -0.97 0.99 584 92 46 83 0.64 -0.10 0.99
AutoZone, Inc. 905 67 22 68 -0.02 -0.93 1.00 586 87 38 78 0.76 0.31 0.99
Baxter International Inc. 905 26 13 24 0.68 0.03 1.00 586 29 9 26 0.69 -0.61 0.99
Boeing Capital Corporation 905 22 12 20 0.66 -0.61 1.00 586 108 78 91 0.77 -0.18 0.99
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 905 22 10 20 0.86 -0.11 1.00 586 38 13 35 0.72 -0.35 0.99
Campbell Soup Company 905 22 7 22 -0.02 -0.86 1.00 586 31 10 28 0.92 0.33 0.99
Cardinal Health, Inc. 905 47 30 35 2.13 4.80 0.99 586 55 18 50 0.63 0.23 0.99
Carnival Corporation 905 32 13 27 1.17 0.18 1.00 586 163 107 134 1.09 0.38 1.00
CenturyTel, Inc. 905 74 20 71 1.20 1.03 0.99 586 109 47 99 0.43 -0.94 0.99
Cigna Corporation 905 38 14 37 0.91 1.77 0.99 586 127 81 115 0.83 0.13 1.00
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC 905 44 17 40 0.46 -0.70 1.00 586 130 59 127 0.65 0.79 0.99
ConocoPhillips 905 22 5 22 -0.33 -0.11 1.00 586 59 26 50 0.97 0.12 0.99
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 905 36 11 36 0.06 -0.88 1.00 586 203 125 178 0.76 -0.29 0.99
CSX Corporation 905 40 13 36 0.57 -0.48 1.00 586 102 45 89 0.41 -1.15 0.99
Devon Energy Corporation 905 36 13 34 0.70 -0.13 1.00 586 60 25 57 0.69 -0.22 0.99
Dominion Resources, Inc. 905 39 12 40 -0.08 -0.62 1.00 586 59 22 52 1.58 2.22 0.99
The Dow Chemical Company 905 31 11 27 0.71 -0.55 0.99 586 177 164 112 1.43 1.09 1.00
Eastman Chemical Company 905 50 10 49 0.40 -0.44 0.99 586 82 43 65 1.15 0.33 0.99
General Electric Capital Corporation 905 21 7 21 0.33 -0.94 1.00 586 276 218 205 0.91 0.10 0.99
Honeywell International Inc 905 20 7 18 0.96 0.26 1.00 586 54 29 45 1.18 0.88 1.00
Loews Corporation 905 31 17 27 0.82 -0.30 1.00 586 56 21 54 0.26 -0.75 0.99
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. 905 55 28 46 3.13 15.75 0.98 586 66 19 61 1.02 1.11 0.99
Omnicom Group Inc. 905 29 11 30 0.33 -0.58 1.00 586 114 98 70 1.37 0.50 1.00
Progress Energy, Inc. 905 39 16 44 -0.30 -0.83 1.00 584 52 14 50 0.33 -0.93 0.99
Safeway Inc. 905 59 15 60 0.23 -0.56 1.00 584 72 24 70 0.18 -0.12 0.99
Sempra Energy 905 35 12 39 -0.15 -0.47 0.99 586 74 31 72 0.33 -0.91 0.99
Simon Property Group, L.P. 905 36 13 36 0.10 -1.17 1.00 584 264 211 176 1.29 0.50 1.00
Southwest Airlines Co. 905 44 15 42 0.58 -0.35 1.00 584 187 100 175 0.91 0.90 0.99
Time Warner Inc. 905 50 17 47 0.39 -0.87 1.00 584 107 48 106 0.34 -0.78 0.99
Transocean Inc. 905 32 7 30 0.65 -0.54 0.99 584 117 80 89 1.49 1.18 1.00
Union Pacific Corporation 905 35 9 35 0.38 0.32 0.99 584 64 26 60 0.90 0.71 0.99
Valero Energy Corporation 486 36 7 36 -0.08 -0.74 0.99 584 174 87 186 0.02 -1.09 1.00
The Walt Disney Company 905 30 15 29 0.59 -0.51 1.00 586 52 23 46 1.01 0.92 0.99
Wells Fargo & Company 905 15 6 14 0.80 0.51 1.00 586 112 58 99 1.08 1.33 0.99
Whirlpool Corporation 905 50 13 47 0.35 -0.76 0.99 584 196 135 152 1.04 0.13 1.00
XL Capital Ltd. 905 41 11 43 -0.03 0.70 1.00 584 392 304 283 0.83 -0.66 0.99
Average 884 38 14 36 0.60 0.36 1.00 585 134 89 109 0.85 0.20 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel J: Fenics
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Ace Limited 904 44 16 42 0.87 1.19 0.99 460 81 38 77 0.49 -0.25 0.99
Alcoa Inc. 904 28 11 26 2.27 8.39 0.98 450 146 104 108 0.61 -1.03 1.00
Altria Group, Inc. 904 89 55 80 0.57 -0.71 1.00 447 85 45 75 0.68 -0.54 0.99
American Express Company 903 22 7 21 0.11 -0.16 1.00 454 248 178 205 0.84 -0.19 0.98
American International Group, Inc. 904 21 7 20 0.84 0.24 0.99 450 707 1002 104 1.54 1.16 0.97
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 904 35 8 34 1.02 0.56 0.98 453 131 81 95 0.63 -1.23 1.00
Arrow Electronics, Inc. 904 77 28 68 1.05 0.04 0.99 453 97 48 88 0.85 0.28 0.99
AT&T Inc. 904 33 11 32 0.51 -0.30 0.99 450 96 57 78 0.89 0.01 0.99
AutoZone, Inc. 903 67 23 67 0.03 -0.85 0.98 454 100 43 99 0.50 -0.04 0.99
Baxter International Inc. 903 28 13 25 0.79 0.15 1.00 448 31 7 31 0.21 -0.65 0.97
Boeing Capital Corporation 904 21 10 18 1.09 0.11 0.99 448 86 57 69 0.42 -1.23 1.00
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 904 21 10 20 0.80 0.04 0.99 446 43 15 42 0.19 -0.96 0.99
Campbell Soup Company 904 22 7 23 0.06 -0.75 0.99 450 57 27 51 0.30 -1.10 0.99
Cardinal Health, Inc. 724 46 25 39 1.79 4.62 0.99 659 56 15 51 1.38 2.12 0.99
Carnival Corporation 618 21 3 21 0.63 2.85 0.95 659 86 49 77 0.67 -0.44 0.99
CenturyTel, Inc. 534 67 10 69 -0.35 -0.71 0.95 659 120 62 91 1.22 0.87 0.99
Cigna Corporation 904 50 25 51 0.79 0.28 0.99 453 59 31 49 0.47 -0.92 0.99
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC . . . . . . . 480 68 34 57 1.51 3.21 0.96
ConocoPhillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 904 37 11 36 0.05 -0.81 0.99 453 188 116 149 0.38 -1.28 0.99
CSX Corporation 904 40 14 37 0.50 -0.57 0.99 450 122 57 120 0.47 -0.64 0.99
Devon Energy Corporation 904 35 7 34 0.22 -0.94 0.99 450 72 28 72 0.29 -0.62 0.99
Dominion Resources, Inc. 903 39 12 40 -0.06 -0.60 0.99 451 62 22 57 0.89 0.23 0.99
The Dow Chemical Company 904 31 11 29 0.60 -0.79 0.99 450 175 189 87 1.39 0.51 1.00
Eastman Chemical Company 904 50 10 50 0.77 0.32 0.98 446 86 45 67 0.82 -0.59 0.99
General Electric Capital Corporation 904 13 3 13 3.10 17.08 0.99 449 114 70 83 0.58 -0.99 0.99
Honeywell International Inc 896 20 8 18 0.91 0.30 0.99 457 46 17 45 0.18 -1.08 0.99
Loews Corporation 904 35 20 33 1.05 0.97 0.99 450 64 27 69 0.03 -0.51 0.99
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. 775 61 26 57 2.96 13.35 0.94 627 79 18 72 1.44 2.25 0.98
Omnicom Group Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Progress Energy, Inc. 904 40 16 44 -0.20 -0.65 0.99 450 52 15 50 0.80 0.88 0.93
Safeway Inc. 904 60 16 60 0.86 2.97 0.94 450 71 23 68 0.51 -0.35 0.99
Sempra Energy 904 35 12 39 -0.11 -0.65 0.99 449 71 32 66 0.79 0.06 0.98
Simon Property Group, L.P. 903 36 12 39 -0.14 -1.38 1.00 451 262 229 163 0.90 -0.61 0.99
Southwest Airlines Co. 904 44 15 43 0.42 -0.33 0.99 450 166 105 153 0.91 0.03 0.99
Time Warner Inc. 904 48 15 47 0.43 -0.35 0.99 450 124 50 131 -0.02 -0.72 0.99
Transocean Inc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Union Pacific Corporation 904 35 9 36 0.27 -0.04 0.98 450 70 29 68 0.24 -0.75 0.99
Valero Energy Corporation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Walt Disney Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wells Fargo & Company 903 15 6 14 1.04 2.08 0.99 451 117 72 101 1.13 0.85 0.98
Whirlpool Corporation 904 51 14 50 0.25 -0.66 0.98 450 191 146 136 1.14 0.00 0.99
XL Capital Ltd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Average 877 39 14 38 0.72 1.23 0.98 473 120 86 86 0.71 -0.12 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel K: Reuters EOD
Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1) Quotes Mean Std Dev Median Skew Kurt AR(1)
Ace Limited 560 87 29 75 0.85 1.09 0.98
Alcoa Inc. 179 637 179 630 0.62 -0.06 0.99
Altria Group, Inc. 560 92 28 90 0.17 -0.54 0.99
American Express Company 559 232 153 180 1.35 0.98 0.99
American International Group, Inc. 556 825 757 587 2.02 8.31 0.92
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation 561 116 72 86 1.29 0.34 1.00
Arrow Electronics, Inc. 560 103 46 85 1.88 3.36 0.99
AT&T Inc. 482 103 40 85 1.21 0.60 0.99
AutoZone, Inc. 559 90 34 78 0.99 0.79 0.99
Baxter International Inc. 560 31 8 30 0.49 -0.67 0.98
Boeing Capital Corporation 561 106 60 88 1.03 0.21 0.99
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company 477 41 12 39 0.68 -0.63 0.98
Campbell Soup Company 560 33 9 32 0.84 0.53 0.99
Cardinal Health, Inc. 557 58 15 56 0.89 1.28 0.98
Carnival Corporation 508 102 44 85 0.78 -0.82 1.00
CenturyTel, Inc. 561 117 41 105 0.55 -0.95 0.99
Cigna Corporation 561 136 75 128 0.97 0.56 0.99
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC 538 69 32 59 1.90 4.15 0.99
ConocoPhillips 561 59 25 49 1.25 0.54 0.99
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 561 216 113 178 0.96 -0.01 0.99
CSX Corporation 173 130 44 145 -0.14 -1.40 0.99
Devon Energy Corporation 558 64 22 61 1.02 0.35 0.99
Dominion Resources, Inc. 561 61 21 54 1.63 2.24 0.99
The Dow Chemical Company 555 189 156 130 1.56 1.39 1.00
Eastman Chemical Company 556 86 41 67 1.28 0.50 0.99
General Electric Capital Corporation 562 297 198 206 0.97 0.05 0.99
Honeywell International Inc 560 57 26 48 1.39 1.52 0.99
Loews Corporation 553 61 16 57 0.38 -0.13 0.98
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. 561 70 18 68 0.72 0.98 0.99
Omnicom Group Inc. 561 120 95 75 1.43 0.58 1.00
Progress Energy, Inc. 551 57 13 59 0.02 -0.85 0.98
Safeway Inc. 536 78 19 79 0.56 0.78 0.98
Sempra Energy 551 80 27 78 0.07 -0.93 0.98
Simon Property Group, L.P. 552 276 205 181 1.41 0.72 1.00
Southwest Airlines Co. 561 200 83 175 1.50 1.88 0.99
Time Warner Inc. 561 109 48 105 0.40 -0.71 0.99
Transocean Inc. 501 124 81 89 1.46 0.85 0.99
Union Pacific Corporation 561 67 23 60 1.28 1.45 0.99
Valero Energy Corporation 559 196 70 199 0.04 -0.62 0.99
The Walt Disney Company 561 55 20 49 1.40 1.86 0.99
Wells Fargo & Company 559 120 50 104 1.69 2.77 0.98
Whirlpool Corporation 561 204 124 154 1.26 0.49 1.00
XL Capital Ltd. 530 415 298 309 0.77 -0.92 0.99
Average 533 148 81 123 1.00 0.74 0.99
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel L: Using all the observations
Europe
Average 
Number of 
Quotes or 
Trades
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number of 
Quotes or 
Trades
Mean S.D. Median
GFI 331 35 20 32 104 95 71 85
CMA 905 31 20 27 664 105 89 78
Markit 869 30 18 27 575 110 94 80
Fenics 874 31 20 27 462 111 101 78
Reuters 527 118 93 89
US
Average 
Number of 
Quotes or 
Trades
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number of 
Quotes or 
Trades
Mean S.D. Median
GFI 140 50 33 47 14 99 119 67
CMA 905 40 27 34 664 128 186 76
Markit 884 38 23 34 585 134 195 79
Fenics 877 39 24 35 473 120 209 74
Reuters 533 148 203 83
Panel M: Using the observations in the days in which there is a trade and quotes in all the data sources
Europe
Average 
Number of 
Trades and 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number of 
Trades and 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
GFI 306 36 17 33 51 128 82 105
CMA 306 35 16 32 51 128 82 104
Markit 306 35 16 32 51 128 81 104
Fenics 306 36 16 32 51 128 82 105
Reuters 51 127 81 103
US
Average 
Number of 
Trades and 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number of 
Trades and 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
GFI 122 54 36 44 11 131 129 95
CMA 122 52 36 44 11 149 124 111
Markit 122 52 36 44 11 148 122 113
Fenics 122 51 37 44 11 130 115 92
Reuters 11 147 123 109
Panel N: Using the observations in the days in which there is not a trade but quotes in all the data sources
Europe
Average 
Number 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
CMA 553 28 19 25 264 135 114 96
Markit 553 28 19 25 264 135 113 96
Fenics 553 28 19 25 264 136 114 97
Reuters 264 135 113 96
US
Average 
Number 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
Average 
Number 
Quotes
Mean S.D. Median
CMA 749 36 20 33 339 151 224 91
Markit 749 36 20 33 339 153 224 93
Fenics 749 37 21 34 339 140 239 88
Reuters 339 147 230 86
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel O: Unit Root Europe
CMA Markit Fenics Reuters CMA Markit Fenics Reuters
Accor I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Aegon NV I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
AKZO Nobel NV I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
AXA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Barclays Bank PLC I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Bayer Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Bertelsmann AG I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
British American Tobacco PLC I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carrefour I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Deutsche Telekom AG I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
EADS NV I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Edison SPA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Electricite de France I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Enel SPA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
EDP - Energias de Portugal SA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
E.ON AG I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Fortum Oyj I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
France Telecom I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Hellenic Telecommunications I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Iberdrola SA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Koninklijke KPN NV I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Marks and Spencer PLC I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Metro AG I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Banca Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena Spa I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Muenchener Rueckversicherung I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
PPR I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Repsol YPF SA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
RWE Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Sodexho Alliance I(1) - I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
GDF Suez I(1) - I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Swiss Reinsurance Company I(1) - I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telecom Italia SPA I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Telefonica SA I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Unilever NV I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Veolia Environnement I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1)
Vodafone Group PLC I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Aktiebolaget Volvo I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Panel P: Unit Root US
CMA Markit Fenics Reuters CMA Markit Fenics Reuters
Ace Limited I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Alcoa Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Altria Group, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
American Express Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1)
American International Group, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0)
Anadarko Petroleum Corporation I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Arrow Electronics, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
AT&T Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
AutoZone, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Baxter International Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Boeing Capital Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Campbell Soup Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Cardinal Health, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Carnival Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CenturyTel, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Cigna Corporation I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Comcast Cable Communications, LLC I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
ConocoPhillips I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
CSX Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Devon Energy Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Dominion Resources, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
The Dow Chemical Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Eastman Chemical Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
General Electric Capital Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Honeywell International Inc I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Loews Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1)
Marsh & McLennan, Inc. I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Omnicom Group Inc. I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
Progress Energy, Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0)
Safeway Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Sempra Energy I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Simon Property Group, L.P. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Southwest Airlines Co. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Time Warner Inc. I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Transocean Inc. I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
Union Pacific Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Valero Energy Corporation I(0) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
The Walt Disney Company I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
Wells Fargo & Company I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
Whirlpool Corporation I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1)
XL Capital Ltd. I(1) I(1) - I(1) I(1) - I(1)
Before 9th August 2007 After 9th August 2007
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Table 2: The distribution of the quoted and traded CDS spreads 
Summary statistics for the distribution of the quoted and traded 5y CDS spreads for the firms in 
Table 1. Panel A provides the distribution of the number of quoted spreads on a given day for a 
single name CDS. The first column reports the number of observations for which there are 1, 2, 3 
and 4 quotes, respectively. The second column reports the percentage of cases in which there are 
1, 2, 3, and 4 quotes, respectively, and is obtained as the ratio of second column and the total 
number of days. The last column of Panel A reports the cumulative percentage across the range 
of quotes. Panel B reports the distribution of the range of the mean absolute difference, in basis 
points, among all the possible pairs of quoted spreads on a given day for a single 5-year CDS. 
For instance, the first row in the first column reports the number of days in which the absolute 
difference between the different pairs of databases is lower than 1 basis point, and so on. Panel C 
provides the distribution of the range of the mean absolute difference, in basis points, between all 
the possible pairs formed by the GFI traded CDS spread and one of the different quoted CDS 
spreads. The sample period is January 2004 to March 2010. 
Panel A
Number of Number of Cumulative
Quotes Observations Percentage
1 1870 0.013 0.013
2 18428 0.131 0.144
3 93168 0.660 0.804
4 27744 0.196 1.000
Total Days 141210
Total Trades 26126 0.185
Panel B
Range of the
mean difference Observations Percentage
among quotes (in b.p.)
Dif < 1 63172 0.447 0.447
1 < Dif <  2 30232 0.214 0.661
2 < Dif < 3 13234 0.094 0.755
3 < Dif < 4 7558 0.054 0.809
4 < Dif <  5 4808 0.034 0.843
5 < Dif <  6 3460 0.025 0.867
6 < Dif <  7 2762 0.020 0.887
7 < Dif <  8 2137 0.015 0.902
8 < Dif <  9 1645 0.012 0.914
9 < Dif <  10 1306 0.009 0.923
10 < Dif <  11 1100 0.008 0.931
11 < Dif <  12 941 0.007 0.937
12 < Dif <  13 749 0.005 0.943
13 < Dif <  14 620 0.004 0.947
14 <  Dif < 15 610 0.004 0.951
15 <  Dif < 16 422 0.003 0.954
16 <  Dif < 17 405 0.003 0.957
17 <  Dif < 18 292 0.002 0.959
18 <  Dif < 19 295 0.002 0.961
19 <  Dif < 20 283 0.002 0.963
Dif >= 20 5179 0.037 1.000
Total Quotes 141210
Percentage
Cumulative 
Percentage
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Table 2 Continued: The distribution of the quoted 
and traded CDS spreads 
 
 
Panel C
Range of the
mean difference Cumulative
between the traded and Percentage
quoted spreads (in b.p.)
Dif < 1 10886 0.409 0.409
1 < Dif <  2 5409 0.203 0.612
2 < Dif < 3 2594 0.097 0.709
3 < Dif < 4 1663 0.062 0.772
4 < Dif <  5 1224 0.046 0.818
5 < Dif <  6 858 0.032 0.850
6 < Dif <  7 628 0.024 0.873
7 < Dif <  8 407 0.015 0.889
8 < Dif <  9 297 0.011 0.900
9 < Dif <  10 261 0.010 0.910
10 < Dif <  11 243 0.009 0.919
11 < Dif <  12 172 0.006 0.925
12 < Dif <  13 235 0.009 0.934
13 < Dif <  14 168 0.006 0.940
14 <  Dif < 15 117 0.004 0.945
15 <  Dif < 16 101 0.004 0.948
16 <  Dif < 17 106 0.004 0.952
17 <  Dif < 18 72 0.003 0.955
18 <  Dif < 19 43 0.002 0.957
19 <  Dif < 20 22 0.001 0.958
Dif >= 20 620 0.023 0.981
Total Quotes 26126
Observations Percentage
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 Table 3: Time-serial correlation between variables 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the dependent and explanatory variables employed in equation (1). Log(Std. Dev. CDS spreads), the dependent variable in equation (1), 
refers to the cross-sectional standard deviation among the CDS spreads reported by the different data sources in a given day. Log (Mkt. Cap.) refers to the logarithm of the firm market 
capitalization. Trade is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there is a trade registered in GFI in the current date and to zero otherwise. Days w/o a trade represents the number of days 
without a trade up to the current date. Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade is constructed as the interaction between the number of days without a transaction up to one day ago and a dummy 
variable (Trade) which equals one if there is a trade the current date. CDS Bid-Ask Spread refers to the daily CDS bid-ask spread which is obtained from CMA. VIX Index represents the value 
of the VIX Index. Max quotes refers to a dummy variable which equals one when all the data sources available at a given date report a quote and is equal to zero otherwise.  
 
Observations = 138653 Log(Std. Dev. CDS spreads) Log(Mkt. Cap.) Trade Days w/o trade Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade CDS Bid-Ask Spread VIX Index Max Quotes
Log(Std. Dev. CDS spreads)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -0.059
Trade -0.157 0.065
Days w/o a trade 0.152 -0.058 -0.206
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.005 0.000 0.156 -0.032
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.414 -0.080 -0.099 0.017 -0.001
VIX Index 0.456 -0.051 -0.133 0.041 0.010 0.480
Max Quotes 0.057 0.025 0.099 -0.157 0.008 -0.053 -0.041
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Table 4: Determinants of the standard deviation 
among the CDS data sources 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is the standard deviation among the different CDS data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, 
Reuters EOD). The database includes ninety European and US firms (47 of the firms are 
European and the rest are American) which are  the most liquid CDSs included in either the 
Itraxx or the CDX Index since the launching of the indexes, from January 2004 to April 2010. 
The estimation uses a fixed-effects model robust to heteroskedasticity. Column (1) reports the 
results for the whole sample of firms, Column (2) reports the results for the subsample of 
European firms, and Column (3) reports the results for the subsample of American firms. The t-
statistics are reported between brackets. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -0.095 -0.048 -0.187
(-10.53) (-5.91) (-12.17)
Trade -0.079 -0.061 -0.078
(-10.01) (-7.11) (-4.95)
Days w/o a trade 0.0003 0.0000 0.0004
(10.80) (1.05) (13.21)
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0013
(-1.97) (0.61) (-3.47)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.041 0.075 0.030
(14.76) (34.77) (11.39)
VIX Index 0.045 0.032 0.051
(64.85) (49.05) (77.25)
Max Quotes 0.290 0.080 0.565
(32.86) (7.86) (37.42)
Constant 0.938 -0.370 3.327
(4.30) (-1.89) (9.00)
R-squared 0.481 0.371 0.458
Number of observations 138653 71605 67048
Number of  groups 90 47 43
Observations per group          Minimum 940 940 1150
Average 1541 1524 1559
Maximum 1569 1569 1569
F-statistic 6922.270 4315.440 3337.690
Prob. > F-statistic 0 0 0
Condition Index 6.64 7.60 6.19  
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Table 5: Determinants of the standard deviation among the CDS data 
sources using the number of contributors as an explanatory variable 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the unbalanced panel regressions. The 
dependent variable is the standard deviation among the different CDS data sources (CMA, 
Markit, Fenics, Reuters EOD). The database includes ninety European and US firms (47 of 
the firms are European and the rest are American) which are  the most liquid CDSs included 
in either the Itraxx or the CDX Index since the launching of the indexes, from January 2004 
to April 2010. The estimation uses a fixed-effects model robust to heteroskedasticity. 
Column (1) reports the baseline regression's results for the whole sample of firms without 
using the number of contributors as an explanatory variable. Column (2) reports the results 
obtained by adding the number of contributors as an additional explanatory variable to the 
ones in Column (1). Column (3) reports the results obtained using as an additional 
explanatory variable a generated regressor which is obtained after regressing the number of 
contributors on the VIX Index and the CDS bid-ask spread and then using the residual to 
proxy the number of contributors net of the global risk and the illiquidity effect in the CDS 
market. In order to estimate the coefficients presented in Column (3) of this table we use the 
bootsptrap methodology to correct any potential bias in the standard errors due to the use of 
a generated regressor. The t-statistics are reported between brackets. 
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -0.095 -0.105 -0.105
(-10.53) (-10.33) (-10.27)
Trade -0.079 -0.134 -0.134
(-10.01) (-16.75) (-15.95)
Days w/o a trade 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004
(10.80) (14.61) (14.73)
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.001 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-1.97) (-1.09)  (-1.10)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.041 0.041 0.041
(14.76) (14.33) (13.70)
VIX Index 0.045 0.048 0.046
(64.85) (66.66) (63.80)
Max Quotes 0.290 0.338 0.338
(32.86) (29.74) (30.23)
Number of Contributors 0.014 0.014
(21.33) (19.86)
Constant 0.938 0.854 1.101
(4.30) (3.49) (4.46)
R-squared 0.481 0.495 0.495
Number of observations 138653 128179 128179
Number of  groups 90 90 90
Observations per group       Minimum 940 332 332
Average 1541 1424 1424
Maximum 1569 1492 1492
F-statistic 6922.270 5870.500
Prob. > F-statistic 0 0
Wald Chi2 47673.88
Prob. > Wald Chi2 0
Condition Index 6.64 10.67 10.67  
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Table 6: Price Discovery Analysis by Pairs of CDS spreads 
This table reports the results of the price discovery analysis. First, we estimate the Gonzalo-
Granger (GG) price discovery metrics for different pairs of 5-year single name CDS spreads 
using different data sources. The estimations are based on a VECM in which the VAR-
length is selected according to the Schwarz information criteria. Then we calculate the 
average Gonzalo-Granger metric for all the firms, the European and the American firms for 
the different pairs of data sources. When the price discovery metric is higher than 0.5, the 
corresponding data source leads the price discovery process. The symbols ***, **, and * 
(^^^, ^^, and ^) summarize the statistical significance test and indicate that the average price 
discovery metric (GG) corresponding to a given data source is significantly higher (lower) 
than 0.5 at a significance level of 99, 95 and 90%, respectively.   
CMA versus Markit GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
CMA 0.574** 0.502 0.660***
Markit 0.426^^ 0.498 0.340^^^
CMA versus Fenics GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
CMA 0.734*** 0.754*** 0.708***
Fenics 0.266^^^ 0.246^^^ 0.292^^^
CMA versus Reuters EOD GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
CMA 0.798*** 0.859*** 0.718***
Reuters EOD 0.202^^^ 0.141^^^ 0.282^^^
Markit versus Fenics GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
Markit 0.771*** 0.800*** 0.735***
Fenics 0.229^^^ 0.200^^^ 0.265^^^
Markit versus Reuters EOD GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
Markit 0.783*** 0.893*** 0.644***
Reuters EOD 0.217^^^ 0.107^^^ 0.356^^^
Fenics versus Reuters EOD GG Price Discovery Metrics
Total Europe US
Fenics 0.398^^^ 0.461 0.318^^^
Reuters EOD 0.602*** 0.539 0.682***  
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Table 7: Determinants of the standard deviation among the CDS data sources using 
proxies for the VIX Index and the CDS illiquidity measure 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent variable 
is the standard deviation among the different CDS data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, Reuters EOD). 
The database includes ninety European and US firms (47 of the firms are European and the rest are 
American) which are the most liquid CDSs included in either the Itraxx or the CDX Index since the 
launching of the indexes, from January 2004 to April 2010. The estimation uses a fixed-effects model 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Column (1) reports the baseline regression results which are the same as in 
Column (1) of Table 4. Column (2) provides the results obtained when we use as an explanatory variable 
a generated regressor which is obtained as the residual of a regression in which the VIX Index is 
regressed on the CDS bid-ask spread. Column (3) reports the results obtained when we use as an 
explanatory variable a generated regressor which is obtained as the residual of a regression in which the 
CDS bid-ask spread is regressed on the VIX Index. In order to estimate the coefficients presented in 
Columns (2) and (3) we use the bootstrap methodology to correct any potential bias in the standard errors 
due to the use of generated regressors. The t-statistics are reported between brackets. 
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -0.095 -0.095 -0.095
(-10.53) (-10.18) (-10.15)
Trade -0.079 -0.079 -0.079
(-10.01) (-10.05) (-11.27)
Days w/o a trade 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(10.80) (11.54) (11.29)
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(-1.97) (-2.12) (-1.81)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.041 0.082
(14.76) (38.96)
VIX Index 0.045 0.057
(64.85) (206.26)
VIX Index net of the CDS Bid-Ask Spread effect 0.045
(64.96)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread net of the VIX Index effect 0.041
(13.54)
Max Quotes 0.290 0.290 0.290
(32.86) (33.99) (31.30)
Constant 0.938 1.642 0.928
(4.30) (7.09) (4.11)
R-squared 0.481 0.482 0.482
Number of observations 138653 138653 138653
Number of  groups 90 90 90
Observations per group                         Minimum 940 940 940
Average 1541 1540.6 1540.6
Maximum 1569 1569 1569
F-statistic 6922.270
Prob. > F-statistic 0.000
Wald Chi2 40905.47 60080.36
Prob. > Wald Chi2 0.000 0.000
Condition Index 6.64 5.06 6.1  
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Table 8: Determinants of the standard deviation among the CDS data sources 
using alternative regression methods 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the unbalanced panel regressions. The dependent 
variable is the standard deviation among the different CDS data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, 
Reuters EOD). The database includes ninety European and US firms (47 of the firms are 
European and the rest are American) which are  the most liquid CDSs included in either the 
Itraxx or the CDX Index since the launching of the indexes, from January 2004 to April 2010. 
We estimate the coefficients of the determinants of the standard deviation among the CDS data 
sources by means of different methodologies. Column (1) reports the results obtained using a 
fixed-effects model robust to heteroskedasticity as in Column (1) of Table 4. The results 
presented in Column (2) are obtained by means of a pooled-regression. Column (3) reports the 
results obtained using a Prais-Winsten regression with correlated panels corrected standard 
errors (PCSEs) and robust to heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation across panels and 
serial autocorrelation within panels. The correlation within panels is treated as a first-order 
autocorrelation AR(1) and the coefficient of this process common to all the panels. Each 
element in the covariance matrix of the disturbances is computed with all available observations 
that are common to the two panels contributing to the covariance. The t-statistics are reported 
between brackets. 
(1) (2) (3)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -0.095 -0.012 -0.019
(-10.53) (-4.96) (-4.87)
Trade -0.079 -0.270 -0.081
(-10.01) (-31.14) (-10.06)
Days w/o a trade 0.0003 0.0011 0.0012
(10.80) (54.31) (29.88)
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.0006 0.0009 0.0001
(-1.97) (2.72) (0.28)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 0.041 0.055 0.033
(14.76) (16.76) (37.84)
VIX Index 0.045 0.041 0.043
(64.85) (46.94) (39.18)
Max Quotes 0.290 0.384 0.394
(32.86) (44.12) (17.00)
Constant 0.938 -1.144 -0.937
(4.30) (-19.79) (-9.34)
R-squared 0.481 0.292 0.093
Number of observations 138653 138653 138653
Number of  groups 90 90
Observations per group        Minimum 940 940
Average 1540.6 1540.589
Maximum 1569 1569
F-statistic 6922.27 5799.58
Prob. > F-statistic 0.000 0.000
Autorregressive (AR(1)) coefficient 0.63
Wald Chi2 4712.68
Prob. > Wald Chi2 0.000  
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Table 9: Determinants of the differences between JPM and Fenics CDS spreads 
This table reports the regression coefficients of the unbalanced panel regressions. The database includes 
ninety European and US firms (47 of the firms are European and the rest are American) which are  the 
most liquid CDSs included in either the Itraxx or the CDX Index since the launching of the indexes, 
from January 2004 to April 2010. The estimation uses a fixed-effects model robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Columns (1) and (2) report the coefficients of the determinants of the JPM and Fenics CDS spreads 
difference in absolute terms when we exclude the CDS Bid-Ask Spread and the VIX Index variables, 
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) provide the coefficients of the determinants of the JPM and Fenics 
CDS difference in relative terms when we exclude the CDS Bid-Ask Spread and the VIX Index 
variables, respectively. The difference in relative terms is obtained as the ratio between the difference in 
absolute terms and the mean between JPM and Fenics spreads. The t-statistics are reported between 
brackets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(Mkt. Cap.) -2.325 0.029 -0.012 -0.009
(-18.31) (0.26) (-10.41) (-7.37)
Trade -0.634 -0.019 -0.006 -0.005
(-9.05) (-0.25) (-9.67) (-7.96)
Days w/o a trade 0.016 0.012 0.000 0.000
(14.04) (11.14) (13.55) (13.14)
Interaction Trade and Days w/o trade -0.004 -0.012 0.00002 0.00001
(-0.68) (-1.08) (0.74) (0.26)
VIX Index 0.3171 0.0003
(42.29) (11.38)
CDS Bid-Ask Spread 1.0290 0.0013
(32.18) (13.36)
Constant 53.738 -2.658 0.330 0.252
(17.74) (-0.98) (12.00) (8.91)
R-squared 0.203 0.320 0.108 0.115
Number of observations 46772 46772 46772 46772
Number of  groups 43 43 43 43
Observations per group       Minimum 891 891 891 891
Average 1088 1088 1088 1088
Maximum 1149 1149 1149 1149
F-statistic 369.480 250.080 114.520 109.030
Prob. > F-statistic 0 0 0 0
Condition Index 4.40 2.99 4.40 2.99
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Figure 1: Single name CDS spreads from different data sources. This figure shows the CDS spreads time series (in basis points) for the different 
data sources (CMA, Markit, Reuters and Fenics) during the period September 2008 – January 2009. 
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Data Sources' Average Absolute Discrepancy (in %)
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Figure 2. Data Sources’ Average Absolute Discrepancies (AAD). This figure shows the cross-sectional deviations 
across data sources over time. The series is computed as the absolute value of the average difference across pairs of 
data sources (CMA - Markit, CMA - Fenics, CMA - Reuters, Markit - Fenics, Markit - Reuters, Fenics – Reuters) 
divided by the average CDS spread across the four previous data sources (CMA, Markit, Fenics, and Reuters) for each 
firm. Then, we calculate the average of the previous series date by date across the total number of entities.  
 
 
